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LESSONS FROM THE NBA LOCKOUT: UNION
DEMOCRACY, PUBLIC SUPPORT, AND THE FOLLY
OF THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL PLAYERS
ASSOCIATION
MATTHEW J. PARLOW*
Abstract
By most accounts, the National Basketball Players Association
(NBPA)—the union representing the players in the NBA—conceded a
significant amount of money and other contractual terms in the new tenyear collective bargaining agreement1 (2011 Agreement2) that ended the
2011 NBA lockout. Player concessions were predictable because the
NBA’s economic structure desperately needed an overhaul. The magnitude
of such concessions, however, was startling. The substantial changes in the
division of basketball-related income, contract lengths and amounts, salary
cap provisions, and revenue sharing rendered the NBA lockout—and the
resulting 2011 Agreement—a near-complete victory for the owners.
Several interpretations have been offered to explain the lopsided deal,
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Marquette University
Law School. I would like to thank Professor Janine Kim for her comments on an earlier
draft of this article; Brittany Earl, Aaron Hernandez, AJ Peterman, and Amy Rogan-Mehta,
for their research assistance; and Marquette University Law School for its financial support.
1. The collective bargaining agreement is the “‘supreme governing authority’
concerning employment” in the employer-employee or ownership-labor relationship—
including in professional sports; it is the result of negotiations in the collective bargaining
process as provided for by the National Labor Relations Act. Michael A. Mahone, Jr.,
Sentencing Guidelines for the Court of Public Opinion: An Analysis of the National Football
League’s Revised Personal Conduct Policy, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 181, 192 (2008).
2. See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n & Nat’l Basketball Players Ass’n, NBPA Collective
Bargaining Agreement (Dec. 11, 2011) (on file with author) [hereinafter 2011 Agreement].
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including the financial strain on players during the lockout and the players’
emotional reactions to the negotiations. These justifications are intriguing,
particularly in light of the racial overtones that marked the entire process.
These explanations have significant merit, but they fail to completely
account for why the NBA players agreed to such drastically unfavorable
terms. This article provides a fuller analysis of how this surprising result
came about. In doing so, it takes an interdisciplinary approach using
communications and industrial relations scholarship that highlight the
critical importance of intra-union communications, public relations
campaigns, and union democracy. Through this analysis, this article not
only assesses the missteps of the NBPA during the NBA lockout, but also
provides guidance to professional sports unions for future collective
bargaining negotiations during periods of labor unrest.
I. Introduction
When the National Basketball Association (NBA) team owners locked
out the players in the summer of 2011,3 it did not come as a surprise to even
the most casual of observers. The economic structure of the league was
badly outdated and in need of revision.4 Moreover, the Great Recession5
accelerated the financial dysfunction of the NBA.6 Given this situation, it
3. The term “lockout” in the context of labor and employment law refers to the
“bargaining mechanism in which an employer refuses to allow its unionized employees to
work—while at the same time withholding their salaries—in order to gain leverage over the
union during labor negotiations.” Nathaniel Grow, Decertifying Players Unions: Lessons
from the NFL and NBA Lockouts of 2011, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 473, 474 n.3 (2013)
(citing C. Quincy Ewell, Comment, The Key to Unlocking the Partial Lockout: A Discussion
of the NLRB’s Decisions in Midwest Generation and Bunting Bearings, 112 PENN. ST. L.
REV. 907, 913 (2008)).
4. See Howard Beck, Powerful Agent’s Blunt Warning About Future of the N.B.A.,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, at D1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/23/sports/
basketball/23falk.html?_r=0 (citing NBA power agent David Falk describing how the
NBA’s financial system was broken in 2009 and what that meant for the renegotiation of the
collective bargaining agreement in 2011).
5. For the purposes of this article, the term “Great Recession” will refer to the
significant economic downturn that affected the United States and global economies
beginning in 2007. See generally Catherine Rampell, ‘Great Recession’: A Brief Etymology,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2009, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/great-recessiona-brief-etymology/.
6. See generally Matthew J. Parlow, The NBA and the Great Recession: Implications
for the Upcoming Collective Bargaining Renegotiation, 6 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 195 (2010); Jim Souhan, NBA’s Dysfunctional Finances Might Mean a Long
Lockout, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 30, 2011, http://www.startribune.com/
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was clear that the negotiations over the 2011 Agreement would be
contentious.
The owners claimed that a majority of them were losing money each
year.7 Accordingly, they demanded major concessions from the players for
the 2011 Agreement.8 The National Basketball Player’s Association
(NBPA) contested this claim, arguing that owners suffered merely
“accounting losses rather than cash going out the door.”9 From the NBPA’s
perspective, then, only modest updates to the terms of the existing
collective bargaining agreement (2005 Agreement10) were needed.11 The
ensuing negotiations focused on the division of the league’s revenue
between the owners and players, contract lengths and amounts, salary cap
provisions, and revenue sharing among the teams.12 Ultimately, the parties
were unable to come to terms, and the NBA team owners locked out the
players on June 30.13
The lockout ended after 161 days, when the two sides finally settled on
the new ten-year 2011 Agreement.14 By nearly all accounts, the players
fared poorly in this deal. Compared to the 2005 Agreement, the players
made dramatic concessions on each of the aforementioned negotiating
terms.15 This result was startling for a variety of reasons. After all, players’
unions were some of the only private-sector unions to increase their
sports/wolves/124826679.html (describing the financial problems with the 2005
Agreement).
7. See Lance Taubin, Note, Welcome to the Real 2011 NBA Lockout: Where OwnerFriendly Tax Provisions and Non-Monetized Benefits Color the Lockout Landscape, 11
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 139, 140-41 (2012).
8. See John R. Sigety, The Cost of Fair Play: An Examination of How Salary Cap
Proposals Have Affected Past Collective Bargaining Agreements and Will Affect the Coming
NBA Collective Bargaining Negotiations, WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J., Fall 2011, at 23, 45.
9. Milad Sedeh, The N.B.P.A. Disclaimer: The End of the Bargaining Relationship or
a Sham?, WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J., Spring 2013, at 56, 57. For a discussion of the
difference between an accounting loss and a cash loss, see José Gabilondo, Financial Moral
Panic! Sarbanes-Oxley, Financier Folk Devils, and Off-Balance-Sheet Arrangements, 36
SETON HALL L. REV. 781, 823-25 (2006).
10. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n & Nat’l Basketball Players Ass’n, NBPA Collective
Bargaining Agreement (July 29, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 Agreement], available at http://
www.nbpa.com/cba/2005.
11. Andrew Brandt, What Owners, Players Want in New CBA, ESPN (June 29, 2011),
http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?page=labor-110629.
12. See infra Part II.
13. NBA Lockout Timeline, NBA, http://www.nba.com/2011/news/09/09/labor-timeline/
(last updated Dec. 9, 2011).
14. Id.
15. See infra Part II.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014

4

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:1

bargaining ability in an era of declining membership and influence for
private-sector unions.16 Moreover, the National Football League (NFL)
was in a similar situation that same summer, but a more player-friendly
collective bargaining agreement emerged from its lockout.17 The NFL
players’ relative success was especially puzzling considering that the NBA
was generally viewed as the league where players held more power than the
owners.18 So why did the NBA players wind up negotiating such a bad deal
for themselves?
Amid much speculation, two explanations for the debacle have become
dominant. One emphasizes the financial strain on players that led to greater
willingness to drop their demands and end the lockout.19 The second
suggests that emotions, rather than economics, propelled players to make
financially irrational decisions during negotiations.20 In particular, the
racial overtones of the negotiating dynamic appeared to influence players’
actions.21 Undoubtedly, both of these explanations help clarify the
problems that plagued the players’ bargaining position. But they fail to
offer a full account of the breakdown that occurred on the players’ side,
especially as it relates to the effectiveness of the players’ union that
spearheaded the negotiations for the 2011 Agreement.
This article explores the structural issues within the NBPA that
undermined the negotiations and resulted in the players’ concession to
essentially all of the owners’ demands. Recent scholarship in the fields of
16. See César F. Rosado Marzán, Book Note, Success Through Political Action:
Collective Bargaining in the Private Sector, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 655, 660 (2003)
(reviewing SUCCESS THROUGH POLITICAL ACTION: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE
SECTOR (Paul F. Clark et al. eds., 2003)). For example, the average baseball player salary in
2003 was $2.37 million compared with $3.21 million in 2012, with minimum salaries
increasing from $300,000 to $480,000 over that same time period—a staggering 60% jump.
Average Salary Hits Record $3.2 Million, ESPN.COM (Dec. 7, 2012), http://espn.go.com/
mlb/story/_/id/8724285/mlb-average-salary-38-percent-32-million. For more information on
the decline of private-sector union membership, see News Release, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Members 2013, at 1 (Jan. 24, 2014), available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf (identifying the union membership rate—
that is, the percentage of wage and salary workers who were members of unions—as 11.3%
in 2012, down from 20.1% in 1983).
17. See Patrick Rishe, Who Won the 2011 NFL Lockout?, FORBES (July 21, 2011),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/sportsmoney/2011/07/21/who-won-the-2011-nfl-lockout/.
18. See Kevin Carpenter, NFL and NBA Lockouts: A U.K. Lawyer’s Legal
Retrospective, 20 SPORTS LAW. J. 1, 5-6 (2013).
19. See infra Part III.A.
20. See infra Part III.C.
21. Id.
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industrial relations and communications, in addition to labor law, provides a
robust framework for analyzing the shortcomings of the NBPA that led to
the 2011 Agreement.22 Specifically, understanding the importance of union
democracy, public relations campaigns, and intra-union communications, to
successful collective bargaining reveals both where the NBPA went wrong
and how other professional players’ unions can negotiate with greater
success in the future.
To begin this analysis, Part II details some of the major terms of the
2011 Agreement and compares them to the terms of the 2005 Agreement.
This Part highlights the nature and extent of the losses that the players
incurred as a result of poor collective bargaining. Part III analyzes the two
dominant explanations for the 2011 Agreement, fleshing out the financial
and emotional concerns that helped drive many of the players’ missteps in
the collective bargaining process. While these explanations have merit,
they tend to emphasize individual players’ motivations over the decisions
and actions of the union.23 Given that the players’ union was leading the
negotiations for most of the process, such explanations can only partially
account for the outcome.
Therefore, Part IV offers alternative, complementary theories for why the
players largely failed in their collective bargaining negotiations. This Part
takes an interdisciplinary approach by looking to communications and
industrial relations scholarship that have yet to be fully mined in the legal
literature on labor disputes and collective bargaining. This scholarship
reveals how the NBPA’s deficiencies in union democracy, intra-union
communications, and public relations undermined its bargaining position
and doomed its efforts at the negotiating table.
The goal of this article is to provide a new and useful framework for
analyzing the collective bargaining process, particularly for players’ unions,
but for other private-sector unions as well. In that sense, it simultaneously
offers guidance for future negotiations by players’ unions and other privatesector unions. Therefore, Part V offers concluding remarks regarding the
implications of this framework.

22. See infra Part IV.
23. An exception to the individualized focus of these explanations is the racial dynamics
between team owners, who are overwhelmingly white, and the players, who are
predominantly African American. This, as I discuss in Part III below, involves a power
struggle that also has a much longer history beyond this particular instance of labor unrest.
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II. The 2011 Agreement
Even before the lockout, the NBA owners claimed that the terms of the
2005 Agreement needed major changes due to the financial losses they
were sustaining each year.24 Specifically, the owners asserted that twentytwo of the NBA’s thirty teams collectively lost more than $300 million in
each of the previous three seasons.25 To address their claimed losses, the
owners wanted four significant concessions from the players under the 2011
Agreement: (1) a greater share of basketball-related income (BRI),26 (2) an
adjustment in player contract length and amount, (3) more limited
exceptions to the salary cap, and (4) changes in revenue sharing.27 The
players eventually crumbled on all four fronts. These concessions
constituted the main changes in the 2011 Agreement compared to the 2005
Agreement.28
In terms of the BRI, the owners wanted to change the existing
allocations, which were 57% for the players and 43% to the owners under
the 2005 Agreement.29 Citing their annual losses, the owners demanded
that the percentages be reversed in their favor, or at least split evenly.30 The
NBPA sought to maintain the existing BRI allocations.31 Ultimately, in
what was perhaps the most significant change to the 2011 Agreement, the
BRI division went from 57-43 in favor of the players to essentially a 50-50
split.32 The players thus relinquished approximately 12% of their collective

24. Gabriel Feldman, Brady v. NFL and Anthony v. NBA: The Shifting Dynamics in
Labor-Management Relations in Professional Sports, 86 TUL. L. REV. 831, 844-45 (2012).
25. Id. at 845.
26. BRI is the aggregate operating revenue of the NBA or its member teams during a
particular season—for example, money from television contracts, ticket sales, merchandise,
and the like. See 2005 Agreement, supra note 10, art. VII, § 1(a).
27. Grow, supra note 3, at 494.
28. Compare 2011 Agreement, supra note 2, with 2005 Agreement, supra note 10; see
also NBA Lockout Timeline, supra note 13.
29. Kemper C. Powell, Note, Beyond Brady and Anthony: The Contemporary Role of
Antitrust Law in the Collective Bargaining Process, 14 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 147,
161 (2013).
30. Grow, supra note 3, at 494 n.140 (noting that the owners were interested in a BRI
split of 57% for the owners and 43% for the players).
31. Taubin, supra note 7, at 146.
32. See Larry Coon, Breaking Down Changes in New CBA, ESPN (Nov. 28, 2011),
http://espn.go.com/nba/story/_/page/CBA-111128/how-new-nba-deal-compares-last-one.
The players’ share of BRI may fluctuate a bit from between 49% and 51% depending on
whether the BRI for a given year exceeds or falls short of expectations. Id.
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salaries in the 2011 Agreement.33 In terms of overall dollars, this change
amounted to an annual revenue shift of somewhere between $225 and $300
million from the players to the owners.34 As these figures demonstrate, the
players conceded a substantial amount of money to the owners in the 2011
Agreement.
The NBA owners also demanded dramatic changes to the lengths and
amounts of player contracts. The owners ideally sought nonguaranteed
player contracts, renewable on an annual basis.35 More realistically, they
wanted to reduce the maximum length of player contracts, the maximum
salaries that players could earn, and the amount of annual raises permitted
in player contracts.36 The NBPA wanted minimal, if any, changes to the
existing permissible contract terms, which were quite favorable to players.37
The owners prevailed on this point, as the 2011 Agreement notably reduced
the length and amount of new contracts and contract extensions for players.
For those teams signing free agents that were eligible for the “Larry Bird
exception” to the salary cap,38 the 2005 Agreement had permitted teams to
sign these players to six-year contracts with 10% raises each year.39 Under
the 2011 Agreement, however, teams can only sign their Larry Bird free
agents to five-year contracts with 7.5% annual raises.40 For contract
extensions, the 2005 Agreement allowed teams to sign their players to
contract extensions for up to five years.41 The 2011 Agreement, on the
33. Alexander C. Krueger-Wyman, Note, Collective Bargaining and the Best Interests
of Basketball, 12 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 171, 188 (2012).
34. See Taubin, supra note 7, at 146.
35. Grow, supra note 3, at 494.
36. Sedeh, supra note 9, at 58; see also Grow, supra note 3, at 494.
37. Cf. Carpenter, supra note 18, at 5 (stating that NBA players were much better off
under the 2005 CBA than were NFL players under their most recent CBA).
38. As a general matter, the Larry Bird exception allows teams to exceed the salary cap
to sign their own free agents. Michael A. McCann, It’s Not About the Money: The Role of
Preferences, Cognitive Biases, and Heuristics Among Professional Athletes, 71 BROOK. L.
REV. 1459, 1488 n.157 (2006) (explaining the origins of the Larry Bird exception); see also
Larry Coon, Larry Coon’s NBA Salary Cap FAQ, CBAFAQ.COM (Jan. 15, 2014), http://
www.cbafaq.com/salarycap.htm#Q32 (detailing the various provisions related to the Larry
Bird exception in the 2011 Agreement).
39. Coon, supra note 32. The maximum salary amount could be no more than 25%,
30%, or 35% of the salary cap, depending on the number of years of service that the player
had at the time. Id.
40. Id. There are similar maximum salary limitations for these player contracts as with
the 2005 Agreement. See id.
41. Id. This provision applied to veteran players or those players finishing their rookie
contracts. See id.
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other hand, limits teams to four-year contract extensions for their players.42
As these provisions demonstrate, the players gave up some financial
security and earning power by agreeing to shorter contracts and smaller
annual raises in the 2011 Agreement. These were not insignificant
concessions, especially given that the average NBA player’s career lasts
only four and a half years.43
On a related matter, the owners sought to limit their payroll costs by
tightening up the “soft” salary cap from the 2005 Agreement, which
provided for a number of generous exceptions that permitted teams to
exceed the maximum salary cap.44 The owners publicly yearned for a
“hard” salary cap, where a team’s total player salary could not exceed the
salary cap for any reason.45 But in reality, the owners wanted more limited
exceptions to the soft salary cap in the 2011 Agreement.46 Given that a
hard salary cap would reduce player salaries, the NBPA naturally opposed a
hard salary cap. Instead, the union wanted to maintain the existing “soft”
salary cap, with only minor modifications.47
Ultimately, the 2011 Agreement preserved the soft salary cap, but it
contained several provisions that limited—either de facto or de jure—a
team’s ability to spend aggressively in excess of that cap. The 2011
Agreement’s treatment of the mid-level exception provides a good example.
The mid-level exception allows a team with a player payroll in excess of
the salary cap to sign a player for an amount equal to the average NBA
player salary.48 The 2005 Agreement permitted teams to offer mid-level
exception contracts for up to five years, starting at $5.765 million in the

42. Id. There is one exception: a team can designate one player on its roster for a fiveyear extension if that player is finishing his rookie contract. Id.
43. Michael A. McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity to Reshape Sports
Law, 119 YALE L.J. 726, 768 (2010).
44. Chris Deubert et al., All Four Quarters: A Retrospective and Analysis of the 2011
Collective Bargaining Process and Agreement in the National Football League, 19 UCLA
ENT. L. REV. 1, 72 n.502 (2012).
45. Carpenter, supra note 18, at 5; see also Benjamin A. Tulis, Final-Offer “Baseball”
Arbitration: Contexts, Mechanics & Applications, 20 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 85,
94 n.33 (2010) (defining a hard salary cap).
46. See NBA Lockout Timeline, supra note 13 (noting that on October 1, 2011, the
owners and players met to negotiate regarding the salary cap and that the owners wanted
changes to the existing soft salary cap).
47. Brandt, supra note 11.
48. See James L. Perzik, Mysteries of the NBA “Salary Cap” and the “Escrow and
Tax” System, in 1 ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: ENTERTAINMENT, ARTS, AND SPORTS LAW
149, 155 (2007), available at SM009 ALI-ABA 149 (Westlaw).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss1/1

2014]

LESSONS FROM THE NBA LOCKOUT

9

2010-11 season, with 8% raises each year.49 The 2011 Agreement, on the
other hand, limits teams that are not paying the luxury tax50 in a given year
to offering four-year, mid-level exception contracts, starting at $5 million
for the 2012-13 season, with 4.5% raises each year.51 For those teams
paying the luxury tax in a given season, the 2011 Agreement further limits
those teams to three-year, mid-level exception contacts, starting at $3
million for the 2012-13 season, with 3% raises.52 The 2011 Agreement thus
reduced the length and amount of mid-level exception contracts; such
contracts are one of the primary avenues for teams to exceed the salary cap
to increase spending on player salaries.
Unlike the other three key negotiation points, revenue sharing53 was less
publicly contentious but still incredibly important to both sides. Players
saw revenue sharing as a key subject for collective bargaining, even though
it had not been collectively bargained previously.54 They wanted to
collectively bargain with the owners on revenue sharing because they saw it
as an opportunity to force smaller-market NBA teams to spend more money
on player salaries.55 Conversely, the NBA owners—while not unanimous
in their views on the topic—saw revenue sharing as a way to avoid

49. Coon, supra note 32.
50. The luxury tax is a penalty or tax imposed on teams whose aggregate player salaries
for a season exceed a specified amount. Richard A. Kaplan, Note, The NBA Luxury Tax
Model: A Misguided Regulatory Regime, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1615, 1617 (2004). The
luxury tax seeks to dissuade teams from having extremely high payrolls and spending
significantly more than their counterparts. See Robert Holo & Jonathan Talansky, Taxing
the Business of Sports, 9 FLA. TAX. REV. 161, 203 n.158 (2008). The monies collected from
the luxury tax are used as part of the league’s revenue sharing plan. See Frank J. Marallo,
Jr., Note, Permeating the Good Old Boys Club: Why Holding the Commissioner of Baseball
to a Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty Is in the “Best Interests” of the Game, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN.
& COM. L. 475, 493 n.134 (2013).
51. Coon, supra note 32.
52. Id.
53. Revenue sharing is the process of sharing some league and team revenue to maintain
competitive balance among teams. John Lombardo, Inside NBA’s Revenue Sharing, SPORTS
BUS. J. (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2012/01/23/
Leagues-and-Governing-Bodies/NBA-revenue.aspx.
54. See Michael J. Fensom, NBA Owners, Players Call For Expanded Revenue Sharing
in New Collective Bargaining Agreement, NJ.COM (June 27, 2011), http://www.nj.com/
nets/index.ssf/2011/06/nba_owners_players_call_for_ex.html; Derek Thompson, The NBA
Lockout: Here’s What You Need to Know, ATLANTIC (June 30, 2011),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/06/the-nba-lockout-heres-what-you-needto-know/241251/.
55. Thompson, supra note 54.
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perpetual financial losses by certain teams and thus maintain or achieve
competitive balance.56
The 2011 Agreement brought about significant changes in the league’s
revenue sharing among teams. At first glance, these changes appear to be
friendlier to the players. Teams not paying the luxury tax (presumably
smaller-market teams) will receive more money from those teams that are
paying the luxury tax (presumably the bigger-market teams) and thus can
spend more on player salaries.57 The new luxury tax system is estimated to
nearly triple the amount of money that is shared or redistributed;58 indeed,
once the new luxury tax system is implemented in this 2013-14 season, it is
anticipated that there will be an additional $140 million in revenue sharing
compared to previous seasons.59 In theory, if the smaller-market teams
have more money to spend on player salaries through such a robust
revenue-sharing system, then the players on those teams should receive
better salaries.
However, certain components of the new luxury tax system suggest that
the terms are not as favorable to players as they may appear.60 Specifically,
the increase in luxury tax—aimed at redistributing league revenue by taxing
teams with higher payrolls—may wind up creating significant financial
disincentives for teams that choose not to exceed the luxury tax threshold.61
If enough teams seek to avoid paying the new luxury tax, there will be less
money to distribute through revenue sharing than was originally estimated.
The comparison in luxury taxes between the 2005 Agreement and the
2011 Agreement is instructive. Under the 2005 Agreement, teams whose
payroll exceeded the luxury tax threshold—an amount equivalent to 61% of

56. See Henry Abbott, Sticking Point: Competitive Balance, ESPN.COM (Sept. 30,
2011), http://espn.go.com/blog/truehoop/post/_/id/32164/sticking-point-competitive-balance.
57. See Coon, supra note 32.
58. Taubin, supra note 7, at 147.
59. See Lombardo, supra note 53.
60. For example, teams paying the luxury tax are more limited in their ability to offer
mid-level exception contracts, in terms of length (three years versus four), starting salary ($3
million instead of $5 million), and per-year salary increases (3% versus 4.5%). See Coon,
supra note 32. Moreover, luxury taxpaying teams cannot acquire as much salary through a
trade as non-taxpaying teams, do not have the biannual exception contract to offer free
agents (as non-taxpaying teams do), and cannot receive a player through a sign-and-trade
agreement. Id.
61. See Brett Pollakoff, Stricter Luxury Tax Penalties in New CBA Could Actually Help
Big Market Teams, NBCSPORTS (Aug. 18, 2013), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/
2013/08/18/stricter-luxury-tax-penalties-in-new-cba-could-actually-help-big-market-teams/
(explaining why few, if any teams, will wind up paying the luxury tax).
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the BRI—were taxed at a dollar-for-dollar amount.62 For the first two years
of the 2011 Agreement, this same dollar-for-dollar luxury tax remained.63
After these first two seasons—the second of which recently concluded—the
luxury tax rates increase dramatically for future seasons. Beginning in
2013-14, teams with player payrolls in excess of the luxury tax threshold
will pay an incremental luxury tax rate based on their team salaries.64 For
the first $5 million that a team surpasses the luxury tax threshold, it will pay
$1.50 for each dollar over that threshold.65 For each additional $5 million
increment that a team’s player salaries exceed the luxury tax threshold, the
team must pay a per-dollar tax of $1.75 (for $5 million to $9,999,999),
$2.50 (for $10 million to $14,999,999), $3.25 (for $15 million to
$19,999,999), and $3.75 (for $20 million to $24,999,999).66
Beginning in the 2014-15 season, the luxury tax system imposes an even
more draconian per-dollar tax for those teams that repeatedly exceed the
luxury tax threshold.67 A repeat offender will be a team that paid the luxury
tax for the previous three seasons (counting backward from the 2014-15
season) or three of the previous four seasons (from the 2015-16 season and
thereafter).68 For those repeat offender teams, the per-dollar luxury tax
amount for that season is increased by one dollar per increment level: $2.50
(for the first $12.5 million over the luxury tax threshold), $2.75 (for an
amount between $12.5 million and $13.75 million), $3.50 (for an amount
between $13.75 million and $17.5 million), and $4.25 (for an amount
between $17.5 million and $21.25 million).69
While the NBPA may have anticipated robust luxury tax revenue to
distribute from the taxpaying, big-market teams to the non-taxpaying,
smaller-market teams, the initial results have suggested otherwise. NBA
62. Zachary Golden, Note, Is This Heaven? No, It’s I.O.U.: Why Major League
Baseball Must Modify Its Current Revenue-Sharing and Luxury-Tax Procedures, 45
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 125, 141 n.129 (2011).
63. Taubin, supra note 7, at 147. The luxury tax threshold for the 2011 Agreement is
now 53.51% of BRI. See Coon, supra note 38.
64. Krueger-Wyman, supra note 33, at 186-87.
65. Coon, supra note 38.
66. Id. For each $5 million increment beginning at $25 million, the per-dollar luxury
tax amount is increased by fifty cents. Id. This luxury tax scale continues to apply to teams
that are not repeat luxury tax offenders in the previous three years for the 2014-15 season or,
as of the 2015-16 season or thereafter, in three of the last four years. Id.
67. See Krueger-Wyman, supra note 33, at 187.
68. Coon, supra note 38.
69. Id. For each $5 million increment beginning at $21.25 million, the per-dollar luxury
tax amount is increased by fifty cents. Id.
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teams have attempted to avoid the luxury tax, paring down their payrolls
through various approaches. For example, twenty of the thirty teams have
used the one-time amnesty clause to cut a player to provide some luxury tax
relief.70 The amnesty clause provides teams with a one-time opportunity to
release one player whose current contract predated the 2011 Agreement,
and thus take his salary out of salary cap and luxury tax calculations.71 The
rather aggressive use of the amnesty clause by teams in the last two years
demonstrates an acute interest in avoiding the luxury tax, even before the
more draconian luxury tax provisions kick in.72
Moreover, sensitivity to the luxury tax appears to have had a chilling
effect on the recent free-agency market in the summer of 2013. For
example, Milwaukee Bucks guard Monta Ellis opted out of the final year of
his contract—valued at $11 million for the season—and turned down an
additional two-year extension of $25 million thinking that he could get a
comparable or better contract through free agency.73 Instead, Ellis signed a
three-year contract with the Dallas Mavericks that will earn him a total of
between $25 and $30 million.74 While this is still a lucrative contract, the
amount is between $6 and $11 million less than the contract with the
Milwaukee Bucks that he declined. Ellis’s contract and others like it may
signal that teams are adjusting their free agency spending, and overall
payroll spending, to avoid paying the luxury tax. If true, this trend will lead
to a drop in players’ value. In this regard, the revenue-sharing envisioned
by the players (and perhaps even the teams) may not come to fruition in the
manner they expected.
70. Jeff Caplan, ‘Amnesty That!’ An Amnesty Find Is Rare, NBA (July 17, 2013),
http://hangtime.blogs.nba.com/2013/07/17/amnesty-that-an-amnesty-find-is-rare/.
71. Coon, supra note 38. The team must still pay the player the amount of the salary
less any amount paid by a team that signs that player to a new contract during the remaining
term of the “amnestied” contract. Id.
72. See, e.g., Mike Bresnahan, Lakers Waive Forward Metta World Peace Under
Amnesty Provision, L.A. TIMES, July 11, 2013, http://www.latimes.com/sports/lakersnow/lasp-ln-lakers-waive-metta-world-peace-20130711,0,510395.story (noting that the Los
Angeles Lakers, a team that has consistently paid the 2005 Agreement’s luxury tax yearafter-year, used the amnesty clause to waive Metta World Peace to save approximately
fifteen million in luxury taxes). Moreover, of the ten remaining teams that have yet to
exercise their rights under the amnesty clause, three of them do not have any contracts that
are eligible to be amnestied. Caplan, supra note 70.
73. Charles F. Gardner, Report: Ellis Agrees to Deal with Mavericks, JSONLINE (July
12, 2013), http://www.jsonline.com/blogs/sports/215280211.html.
74. Matt Moore, Monta Ellis Agrees to Three-Year Deal with Dallas Mavericks,
CBSSPORTS (July 12, 2013), http://www.cbssports.com/nba/blog/eye-on-basketball/2273
4318/monta-ellis-agrees-to-three-year-deal-with-dallas-mavericks.
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To be sure, the 2011 Agreement was not a complete disaster for the
players; there were terms that the players could point to as being beneficial
to their interests. For example, under the 2011 Agreement, teams must
spend a minimum of 85% to 90% of the salary cap as a minimum payroll
versus merely 75% of the salary cap under the 2005 Agreement.75
However, when one considers the four major deal points, the players made
key concessions, the magnitude of which can be aptly described as ranging
from significant (for the salary cap modifications), to substantial (for the
changes in contract terms), to massive (for the reduction in BRI for the
players).
III. The Traditional Explanations
Commentators posit various theories as to why the NBPA wound up
with a relatively undesirable deal in the 2011 Agreement. These include
the financial strain that the lockout inflicted on players, the overestimation
of the impact of NBA players playing overseas, and the players’ emotional
reactions to the collective bargaining negotiations, coupled with the impact
racial overtones had on the process. While each of these explanations holds
some truth, they—whether individually or collectively—do not fully
explain the unfavorable results of the NBPA’s efforts.
A. Financial Strain on Players
As with most labor lockouts—whether in the setting of professional
sports or in less high-profile industries—financial considerations and
circumstances played a key role in negotiations. To be sure, the NBPA
attempted to minimize the financial impact on its members. More than two
years before the lockout occurred, the NBPA anticipated that the NBA
owners would lock the players out in the summer of 2011.76 Accordingly,
in a fifty-six-page instructional “Lockout Handbook,” the NBPA warned its
players well in advance of the lockout to make financial arrangements to
sustain themselves through an extended lockout that would almost certainly
entail some cancelled games and potentially a cancelled season (with the
75. Krueger-Wyman, supra note 33, at 189.
76. Kurt Helin, Union Head Billy Hunter Says Little Progress Made in Talks,
NBCSPORTS (Sept. 23, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/09/23/unionhead-billy-hunter-says-little-progress-made-in-talks/; see also Kurt Helin, Player Reaction to
Preseason Postponement: Saw That Coming, NBCSPORTS (Sept. 22, 2011), http://probasket
balltalk.nbcsports.com/2011/09/22/player-reaction-to-preseason-postponement-saw-thatcoming [hereinafter Helin Player Reaction] (quoting Jared Dudley as saying, “[The NBA]
want[s] us to miss checks. They want us to feel the burn. We knew this.”).
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attendant loss in income for the players).77 Players claimed that they were
prepared for the lockout and were ready to weather the financial loss until a
fair deal was struck between the players and owners.78 This position was
relatively easy to take early in the lockout because players were not due to
receive their first paychecks for the 2011-12 season until November 15,
2011.79 Moreover, in September 2011, the players were set to receive 8%
of their salary from the 2010-11 season as part of the NBA’s escrow
system.80 The players thus appeared to be financially equipped for the
lockout.
However, it turned out that the players had not adequately insulated
themselves from financial pressure. Perhaps this should not come as a
surprise, as much has been written on the precarious nature of professional
athletes’ financial well-being.81 For example, during this same period of
time—and in the midst of the NFL lockout—it was reported that more than
20% of NFL players lived paycheck-to-paycheck.82 NBA players were not
immune to this pervasive trend in professional sports: many players were
still living paycheck-to-paycheck, despite all of the NBPA warnings over

77. Mason Levinson, NBA Union Urges Players to ‘Prepare for Worst’ in Lockout
Instruction Book, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 11, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-0311/nba-union-urges-players-to-prepare-for-worst-in-lockout-instruction-book.html.
78. See Helin, Player Reaction, supra note 76.
79. Kurt Helin, So How Does This Lockout Get Resolved?, NBCSPORTS (July 1, 2011),
http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/01/so-how-does-this-lockout-get-resolved.
80. See Kurt Helin, About the Players Not Getting Paychecks . . . They Are About To,
NBCSPORTS (Sept. 8, 2011) http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/09/08/about-theplayers-not-getting-paychecks%E2%80%A6-they-are-about-to/. Under the escrow system,
the league withholds a portion of each player’s salary in a given season to ensure that the
players do not receive a greater percentage of BRI for that season than that to which they are
entitled under the collective bargaining agreement. Id. These monies, which are put into
escrow, are then paid to the players after the conclusion of the season and fiscal year so that
the BRI can be calculated and the appropriate amount of withheld money returned to the
players. Id.
81. See, e.g., Pablo S. Torre, How (and Why) Athletes Go Broke, SI (Mar. 23, 2009),
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1153364 (noting, among other
things, that within two years of retirement, 78% of former NFL players go bankrupt or
experience severe financial hardship and that 60% of former NBA players are broke within
five years of retirement).
82. Bill Briggs, NFL Owners Won’t Run Hurry-Up Offense vs. Players, MSNBC (Mar.
2, 2011), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/41855264/ns/business-personal_finance/#.Uf6c7Rbv
zoA.
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the preceding several years.83 The financial vulnerability of these players
provided leverage for the owners in the collective bargaining negotiations.
As the lockout progressed, the NBA began to cancel preseason84 and
then regular-season games.85
Understandably, those players living
paycheck-to-paycheck began to bristle as they lost salary from these
cancelled games.86 These short-term salary losses were significant given
that the average NBA player’s career is a mere four-and-a-half years.87
Indeed, players who were reaching the end of their careers, players who had
been injured, and middle-of-the-road players whose lucrative contracts
were about to expire all acutely felt the impact of cancelled games and the
potential cancellation of the entire season.88 Some NBA players, like Kobe
Bryant, were sufficiently concerned about the financial state of other
players—and thus the union’s ability to keep a unified player position—that
they offered to lend other players money if the lockout lasted an extended

83. Adrian Wojnarowski, NBA Stars Face Roadblock to Play in China, YAHOO (Aug.
15, 2011), http://sports.yahoo.com/nba/news?slug=aw-wojnarowski_nba_players_china_08
1511.
84. Howard Beck, The N.B.A. Cancels 43 Preseason Games, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24,
2011, at D6.
85. Trevor E. Brice, Labor Pains on the Playing Field: Why Taking a Page from
Europe’s Playbook Could Help the United States, 20 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 49, 60 (2013).
There was also the more macro-level concern that the longer the lockout lasted, the more
likely that some significant portion of the NBA’s fan base might become alienated—
resulting in a decrease in the league’s overall revenue and thus the players’ amount of BRI.
See Kurt Helin, With NBA Lockout There Are Plenty of Losers, but It Starts with Fans,
NBCSPORTS (July 1, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/01/with-nbalockout-there-are-plenty-of-losers-but-it-starts-with-fans/; see also Kurt Helin, NBA Owners
Take Big Risk Playing Fans for Fools, NBCSPORTS (Oct. 11, 2011), http://probasketball
talk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/11/nba-owners-take-big-risk-playing-fans-for-fools (noting that
casual fans, angered by the lockout, might simply turn their attention and entertainment
spending to other venues).
86. See Kurt Helin, Add Samardo Samuels to List of Guys Frustrated with Union,
NBCSPORTS (Nov. 15, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/15/add-samar
do-samuels-to-list-of-guys-frustrated-with-union/.
87. Ira Winderman, Winderman: Average NBA Player Can’t Miss Full Season,
NBCSPORTS (Sept. 13, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/09/13/winder
man-average-nba-player-can%e2%80%99t-miss-full-season.
88. Kurt Helin, Which Players Have the Most to Lose with a Long Lockout?,
NBCSPORTS (Oct. 21, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/21/whichplayers-have-the-most-to-lose-with-a-long-lockout/ (citing examples, such as Mehmet Okur,
James Posey, and Charlie Bell, who faced significant challenges because of their inability to
play cancelled games (or the entire season) due to the lockout).
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period of time.89 Other players sought employment elsewhere to help
sustain them during the lockout. For example, after complaining about the
lack of health insurance for himself and his family, Delonte West applied
for a job at Home Depot before eventually taking a job stocking
merchandize at a furniture store.90 Luke Walton took a position as an
assistant coach for the University of Memphis’s men’s basketball team,
with the understanding that he could leave the position and return to the
NBA when the lockout ended.91
Elite players, on the other hand, did not experience the same kind of
financial pressures as many of their fellow union members. This may have
been due, in part, to the fact that many of them had earned more than $100
million during their playing careers and thus were financially stable.92
Significantly, the NBA’s elite players also had more lucrative opportunities
during the lockout than most players. For example, Kobe Bryant, Kevin
Durant, and Derrick Rose reportedly earned more than $400,000—taxfree—to play in a few exhibition games against local teams in the
Philippines.93 Chris Paul, Dwayne Wade, and Carmelo Anthony earned a
significant amount of money from their promotional Jordan Brand Flight
Tour of China.94 As will be analyzed below, the dramatic difference in
position between the NBA’s elite players and all other players may have
89. Kurt Helin, Kobe Bryant Willing to Loan Players Money if Lockout Lingers,
NBCSPORTS (Sept. 19, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/09/19/kobe-bry
ant-willing-to-loan-players-money-if-lockout-lingers.
90. Kurt Helin, Delonte West Says He Has a Job in a Furniture Store, NBCSPORTS
(Sept. 29, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/09/29/delonte-west-says-hehas-a-job-in-a-furniture-store; Kurt Helin, Did Delonte West Apply for a Job at Home
Depot?, NBCSPORTS (Aug. 19, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/08/19/
did-delonte-west-apply-for-a-job-at-home-depot.
91. See Brett Pollakoff, Luke Walton Hired as Assistant Coach for the University of
Memphis, NBCSPORTS (Aug. 22, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/08/22/
luke-walton-hired-as-assistant-coach-for-the-university-of-memphis.
92. See Jonathan Abrams, The National Basketball Association’s European Vacation,
GRANTLAND.COM (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.grantland.com/story/_/id/6784931/thenational-basketball-association-european-vacation.
93. Kurt Helin, Kobe, Durant Rose Well Paid for Philippines Pickup Game,
NBCSPORTS (July 25, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/25/kobedurant-rose-well-paid-for-philippines-pickup-game/.
94. Ken Berger, Why Have NBA’s Biggest Stars Gone Quiet at Crucial Time?,
CBSSPORTS.COM (July 26, 2011), http://www.cbssports.com/nba/story/15356359/why-havenbas-biggest-stars-gone-quiet-at-crucial-time; Ira Winderman, Winderman: Challenge in
NBA Lockout Is Owners, Players Infighting, NBCSPORTS (July 26, 2011), http://probasket
balltalk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/26/winderman-challenge-in-nba-lockout-is-owners-playersinfighting.
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been at the root of the internal union problems that weakened their
collective bargaining efforts and results.
B. The Trojan Horse: Overseas Playing Opportunities
Some NBA players pursued opportunities to play basketball abroad.95
The NBPA hoped to use players’ international marketability as leverage
with the owners and thus encouraged players to sign with foreign teams.96
In fact, NBPA Executive Director Billy Hunter praised Deron Williams for
his one-season contract with Turkey’s Besiktas Cola Turka, claiming that
the deal demonstrated that players would “not be intimidated by the
league’s hard-line tactics.”97 However, it quickly became public knowledge
that the union was advising players to negotiate an opt-out clause in their
contracts so that they could return to play in the NBA when the lockout
ended.98 In this regard, it is unlikely that the NBA owners felt threatened
by these foreign contracts.
In fact, there were several reasons why such contracts would not have
concerned NBA owners and, perhaps more importantly, why players might
have chosen not to enter into such contracts. NBA players faced the risk
that if they sustained a serious injury playing overseas, their NBA contracts,
which would otherwise remain valid, could be voided.99 For more marginal
players with modest contracts, playing abroad may have held some appeal;
however, for other players with more lucrative contracts, such risks
outweighed the financial benefits, even if they could get their contracts
insured.100 This latter point became an issue for many NBA players, as
foreign teams simply could not afford to insure NBA player contracts in
95. Abrams, supra note 80.
96. Kurt Helin, Union Letter to NBA Players: Keep Looking Overseas, NBCSPORTS
(July 13, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/13/union-letter-to-nbaplayers-keep-looking-overseas/.
97. Howard Beck, Want to Play Abroad During the Lockout? No Problem, Says the
Players Union, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2011, at B18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/07/14/sports/basketball/union-leaders-give-players-support-to-play-overseas.html
(quoting Billy Hunter). Williams’s contract contained an opt-out provision that allowed him
to return to the NBA when the lockout concluded. Id.
98. NBA Lockout: Union Memo Supports Players Going Overseas, NJ.COM (July 13,
2011), http://www.nj.com/nets/index.ssf/2011/07/nba_lockout_union_memo_support.html.
99. Kurt Helin, Players Union Pushing Idea ‘Melo, Other Stars Might Play in Europe,
NBCSPORTS (July 8, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/08/playersunion-pushing-idea-%E2%80%98melo-other-stars-might-play-in-europe/.
100. Kurt Helin, Don’t Expect a Flood of Top NBA Players to Europe, NBCSPORTS (July
7, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/07/don%E2%80%99t-expect-aflood-of-top-nba-players-to-europe/ [hereinafter Helin, Don’t Expect a Flood].
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order to sign these players to overseas contracts.101 This insurance issue
was of such importance that the NBPA even attempted to assist foreign
teams with finding month-to-month insurance policies.102
In addition, many foreign teams were not interested in signing NBA
players merely for a portion of their respective seasons, as they assumed
that players would exercise their opt-out clauses and return to the NBA.103
In fact, the Chinese Basketball Association adopted two rules that severely
restricted the ability, and/or interest, of NBA players to play in its league.
First, the Chinese league only allowed teams to sign an NBA player who
was a free agent, of which there were only 108.104 Second, the Chinese
league prevented those free-agent NBA players from negotiating opt-out
clauses in their Chinese league contracts.105
Even if these various logistical hurdles did not exist, players faced
relatively meager overseas salaries compared to their NBA pay. Instead of
the average player salary of $5.8 million (equaling approximately $430,000
per month), NBA players signing contracts abroad earned, on average,

101. Kurt Helin, Insurance Issues Holding Up Bogut from Playing Down Under,
NBCSPORTS (Sept. 23, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/09/23/insuranceissues-holding-up-bogut-from-playing-down-under/; see also Kurt Helin, Artest’s Great
English Adventure May Be Done In by Insurance, NBCSPORTS (Aug. 19, 2011), http://pro
basketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/08/19/artest%E2%80%99s-great-english-adventure-maybe-done-in-by-insurance/ (explaining that Metta World Peace’s proposed contract with the
Cheshire Jets in Britain fell through because the team was unable to insure his $21 million
contract with the Los Angeles Lakers); Marc Stein, Andrew Bogut Won’t Play in Australia,
(Oct. 6, 2011), http://espn.go.com/nba/story/_/id/7066742/andrew-bogutESPN.COM
milwaukee-bucks-deal-australian-team-agent-says (noting that the Sydney Kings could not
afford to insure Andrew Bogut’s $39 million contract with the Milwaukee Bucks in order to
sign him).
102. Kurt Helin, Union to Help Players Get Insurance if They Head Overseas,
NBCSPORTS (July 18, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/18/union-tohelp-players-get-insurance-if-they-head-overseas/.
103. Kurt Helin, Europe’s Best Teams Still Hesitant to Sign NBA Stars, NBCSPORTS
(Aug. 9, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/08/09/europe’s-best-teams-stillhesitant-to-sign-nba-stars/.
104. Jon Pastuszek, CBA Bars Players with Active NBA Contracts from Playing in
China, NIUBBALL (Aug. 19, 2011), http://www.niubball.com/2011/08/cba-bars-playerswith-active-nba-contracts-from-playing-in-china/.
105. Kurt Helin, Chinese League Moves to Block NBA Player Influx, NBCSPORTS (Aug.
18, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/08/18/chinese-league-moves-toblock-nba-player-influx/.
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between $50,000 and $75,000 per month.106 Perhaps this is why the vast
majority of players signing foreign contracts were “rookies, middling
veterans, and fringe players.”107 Even those players with more lucrative
overseas contracts earned a fraction of their NBA salaries. Deron
Williams’s contract—the one held out as a model by the NBPA—was
worth $200,000 per month, merely one-tenth of his NBA contract.108
Kenyon Martin and J.R. Smith signed with teams in the Chinese Basketball
Association for $2.6 million and $3 million respectively,109 but those
salaries were significantly less than the $16.5 million and $6.7 million,
respectively, that each earned in the NBA during the 2010-11 season.110
Finally, several NBA players who had previously played overseas
warned their fellow union members of the cultural challenges of playing
abroad. For example, Josh Childress—who had spent three years playing in
Greece before returning to play in the NBA—advised players against
playing abroad.111 In particular, Childress noted that the more physical
style of overseas basketball was different than in the NBA, foreign coaches
had more power and influence than NBA coaches, and the leagues had a far
more demanding travel schedule than the one players experienced in the

106. Howard Beck, A Lot of Talk, but Few Stars Have Left the Country to Play, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 13, 2011, at B14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/sports/
basketball/nba-lockout-few-stars-join-foreign-teams.html.
107. Id. Even for the player whose salary was the $1 million minimum veteran’s salary,
playing abroad may have posed too great a risk.
108. Helin, Don’t Expect a Flood, supra note 100. Williams’s deal covered housing
expenses, a driver, a security guard, and a personal assistant, but even with these perks, the
contract paled in comparison to his NBA contract. See id.
109. Kurt Helin, J.R. Smith’s Demands Have Chinese Team Frustrated, NBCSPORTS
(Nov. 22, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/22/j-r-smiths-demandshave-chinese-team-frustrated/; Adrian Wojnarowski, Kenyon Martin Leaving Chinese Team,
YAHOO (Dec. 21, 2011), http://sports.yahoo.com/nba/news?slug=aw-wojnarowski_kenyon_
martin_china_nba_122111.
110. Christopher Dempsey, Kenyon Martin Simmers over Lack of Contract Extension
Offer from Nuggets, DENVER POST, Sept. 30, 2010, http://blogs.denverpost.com/nuggets/
2010/09/30/kenyon-martin-simmers-over-lack-of-contract-extension-offer-from-nuggets/17
14/ (noting Martin’s $16.5 million salary for the 2010-11 season); Marc Stein, Sources:
Mavs Chasing Prince, Smith, ESPN (Feb. 24, 2011), http://espn.go.com/blog/truehoop/
post/_/id/25316/sources-mavs-chasing-prince-smith (noting Smith’s 2010-11 salary of $6.7
million).
111. Kurt Helin, Suns’ Childress Doesn’t Get NBA Players Talking Europe, NBCSPORTS
(July 13, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/13/suns-childress-doesn%
E2%80%99t-get-nba-players-talking-europe/.
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NBA.112 In addition, those players that did play overseas reported facing
various difficulties related to living in a foreign country: housing, travel
accommodations, food, language, communication style, and other simple
activities of daily living.113
For all of these reasons, the leverage that the NBPA expected from the
threat of NBA players playing overseas never materialized. What seemed
like a negotiating tool in concept turned out to be, in reality, a relatively
unattractive alternative path for players—one riddled with logistical flaws
and minimal remunerative upside.
C. Players’ Emotional Reactions and the Racial Overtones of the
Negotiations
Another popular explanation for why the players suffered significant
losses in the 2011 Agreement was that they became too emotional during
the negotiations.114 Many commentators believed that the players failed to
112. Id.; Kurt Helin, European Veteran Warns: This Isn’t Like the NBA, NBCSPORTS
(July 22, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/22/european-veteran-warnsthis-isnt-like-the-nba/. At least one NBA player, Ty Lawson, had difficulty adjusting to the
more physical style of play and even tweeted about his frustration. Kurt Helin, Ty Lawson
Lashes out on Twitter; Adjusting to Europe Not Easy, NBCSPORTS (Oct. 25, 2011), http://
probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/25/ty-lawson-lashes-out-on-twitter-adjusting-toeurope-not-easy/.
113. See, e.g., Kurt Helin, J.J. Hickson Is One Game and Done in Israel, NBCSPORTS
(Nov. 4, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/04/j-j-hickson-is-one-gameand-done-in-israel/ (noting how J.J. Hickson’s Israeli team, Bnei Hasharon, released him
after he was late to practice); Guan Weijia, Weijia Column: J.R. Smith Adjusting Slowly to
China, SHERIDANHOOPS (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.sheridanhoops.com/2011/10/26/weijiacolumn-j-r-smith-adjusting-slowly-to-china (explaining J.R. Smith’s frustration with a
Chinese censorship policy that made it difficult for him to use Twitter); Deron Williams,
D’Will’s Turkey Diary, Part 1: The Transition, ESPN (Oct. 7, 2011), http://espn.go.com/
blog/new-york/new-jersey-nets/post/_/id/1940/d-wills-turkey-diary-part-1-the-transition
(describing the challenging transition that he and his family faced in Turkey, including
finding housing and road travel for away games); Nima Zarrabi, Austin Daye: “I’m Eager to
Come Home”, HOOPSHYPE (Nov. 10, 2011), http://hoopshype.com/blogs/zarrabi/austindaye-im-eager-to-come-home (noting Austin Daye’s troubles with the language barrier and
food in Moscow).
114. See, e.g., Kurt Helin, It Was Players’ Idea to Decertify, but Did They Really
Understand?, NBCSPORTS (Nov. 15, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/
15/it-was-players%E2%80%99-idea-to-decertify-but-did-they-really-understand/
[hereinafter Helin, Players’ Idea to Decertify]; Matt Moore, Dear Mr. Thomas: A Response
to Etan Thomas’ Op-Ed, NBCSPORTS (Nov. 13, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.
com/2011/11/13/dear-mr-thomas-a-response-to-etan-thomas-op-ed/ [hereinafter Moore,
Dear Mr. Thomas].
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execute a well-devised strategy during the lockout because they allowed
NBA Commissioner David Stern’s comments to get to them.115 One
reporter characterized the players’ approach during the lockout as irrational,
comparing them to an innocent man who refused to take a plea bargain in a
criminal case even though it would be in his best interest to do so.116
Indeed, there appears to be a fair amount of evidence to support this
characterization.
Even before the lockout began, players seemed to feel insulted and
exploited by the NBA owners. In an opinion piece published in late June of
2011, Etan Thomas—the NBPA Executive First Vice President—called the
owners greedy for pursuing a hard salary cap, nonguaranteed contracts, and
other economic concessions in the 2011 Agreement.117 Thomas strongly
resisted the idea that the owners had conceded anything when they backed
off of their push for nonguaranteed contracts.118 In particular, Thomas
stated, “This cannot be a starting point for us. They have in essence tried to
insult our intelligence by making us think that something they have ‘given
us’ is a slam dunk when in reality its [sic] very far from progress.”119 As
the two sides headed into the lockout, it was evident that some players felt
as though the owners were not negotiating in good faith.
As the lockout wore on, players’ belief that the owners were exploiting
them became more prevalent.120 In response to the owners’ take-it-orleave-it negotiating style, Tyson Chandler compared the owners to dictators
for demanding a 50-50 split in BRI, even after the players had expressed a
willingness to give up several percentage points from the 57% they enjoyed
under the 2005 Agreement.121 Towards the end of October 2011, NBPA
Executive Director Billy Hunter pursued this theme further by stating that

115. See Moore, Dear Mr. Thomas, supra note 114.
116. Id.
117. Etan Thomas, United We Stand, HOOPSHYPE (June 27, 2011), http://hoopshype.
com/blogs/thomas/united-we-stand.
118. Id.
119. Id. Thomas, in addressing the owners’ proposal of a flexible salary cap—which
Thomas equated to a hard salary cap—wrote, “They are trying to bamboozle us and really
it’s insulting.” Id.
120. See, e.g., Kurt Helin, NBA Players Take to Twitter to Make Their Case, Call
Owners Greedy, NBCSPORTS (Oct. 20, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/
10/20/nba-players-take-to-twitter-to-make-their-case/.
121. Kurt Helin, Tyson Chandler Says Owners are Negotiating Like “Dictators”,
NBCSPORTS (Oct. 24, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/24/tysonchandler-says-owners-are-negotiating-like-%E2%80%9Cdictators%E2%80%9D/.
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the players did not want “to be totally exploited” by the owners.122 Then in
November 2011, Etan Thomas again weighed in on the owners’ bargaining
position, saying that the owners—whom Thomas labeled as part of
America’s wealthiest one percent—felt entitled to tell the players what to
do.123 Several commentators similarly found the owners’ actions to be
particularly egregious. For example, one reporter wrote that there was “no
‘bargaining’ going on . . . just extortion.”124 Another commentator
admonished the owners to “stop hurling alley-oops when they’re up by 30
with two minutes left in the fourth quarter, trying to push the margin to
40.”125 Some analysts even called on the owners to extend an olive branch
to the players, allowing the players to save face and accept a deal.126
Moreover, many players seriously doubted the owners’ claims that
draconian changes were necessary for the 2011 Agreement.127 These
players did not find the necessary correlation between the need to boost
struggling teams’ revenue and a dramatic cut in players’ salaries.128 Here,
too, the players’ views were supported by other sources. For example, the
NBPA’s consultant, Kevin Murphy—a University of Chicago economics
122. Kurt Helin, Union Head Hunter: “We Don’t Want to Be Totally Exploited”,
NBCSPORTS (Oct. 24, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/24/union-headhunter-%E2%80%9Cwe-dont-want-to-be-totally-exploited%E2%80%9D (quoting Billy
Hunter).
123. Etan Thomas, NBA Labor-Negotiation Questions, ESPN (Nov. 12, 2011),
http://espn.go.com/espn/commentary/story/_/id/7223340/etan-thomas-questions-nba-labornegotiations.
124. Matt Moore, The Real Problem on the Players’ Side in This Fight, NBCSPORTS
(Nov. 12, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/12/the-real-problem-on-theplayers-side-in-this-fight [hereinafter Moore, The Real Problem].
125. Kurt Helin, Talking Decertification, Union Moves with CBA Expert Larry Coon,
NBCSPORTS (Nov. 7, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/07/talkingdecertification-union-moves-with-cba-expert-larry-coon/ (quoting Larry Coon).
126. Id. Even after the two sides reached a tentative deal for the 2011 Agreement, some
commentators lamented that the players wound up taking a significant pay cut—finding it
undeserved. See, e.g., Dave Zirin, NBA Lockout Ends and Players Get Played, NATION
(Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.thenation.com/blog/164822/nba-lockout-ends-and-players-getplayed.
127. See, e.g., Kurt Helin, Bulls Kyle Korver Calls Lockout a “Shame”, NBCSPORTS
(July 20, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/20/bulls-kyle-korver-callslockout-a-%E2%80%9Cshame%E2%80%9D/.
128. See Kurt Helin, NBA Owners Could Vote to Approve Lockout Tuesday, NBCSPORTS
(June 28, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/06/28/nba-owners-could-voteto-approve-lockout-tuesday/. Instead, players called on the more financially secure teams to
make concessions—through better revenue sharing—to help teams that were struggling
financially. See id.
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professor—agreed with the players’ beliefs about the owners’ financial
situation, arguing that the teams’ descriptions of their financial problems
were exaggerated.129 Specifically, Dr. Murphy explained that NBA owners
were making money on their investments in their teams even when they
experienced budget losses in a given year.130 He described how the
appreciation in the value of the franchise surpassed the yearly cash-flow
losses teams experienced.131
Dr. Murphy also pointed out that while any team owner who bought in
2007 or thereafter likely suffered operating losses, prior to 2007, owners
enjoyed 8% to 9% returns on their investment each year.132 He thus argued
that it was unfair to hold the players accountable for the recent losses when
the players were not considered responsible—nor rewarded—for the earlier,
more lucrative years.133 Even if the players should have had to make up for
the owners’ losses, Dr. Murphy explained that if the players agreed to take
52.5% of BRI—a figure higher than that at which they ultimately wound
up—that concession would more than cover the owners’ losses.134 While
an economist for the NBA owners would have, no doubt, disputed Dr.
Murphy’s findings, his research provided important fodder for the players’
strong belief that the owners were taking advantage of them.
Another factor related to the imbalance of power between the owners and
the players may well have affected the players’ feelings and actions during
the collective bargaining negotiations: race. As described above, both
before and during the lockout, players believed that the owners were not
negotiating in good faith. The players also felt as though the owners were
rigid and sought to unilaterally dictate their preferred terms rather than

129. See Steve Aschburner, Renowned Economist Murphy Lends Smarts to NBPA Cause,
NBA (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.nba.com/2011/news/features/steve_aschburner/10/27/
lockout-q-and-a-kevin-murphy/index.html.
130. See id.
131. See id. Dr. Murphy explained why this was an advantageous position for team
owners and thus why their arguments regarding financial losses were, in his estimation,
disingenuous:
[Y]ou’ve got a tax loss annually on your operating and you’ve got a capital
gain at the end that you accumulate untaxed until you sell it and then pay a
lower rate. So you get a deferred tax treatment on the gains and an immediate
tax treatment on the losses . . . .
Id. (quoting Dr. Murphy).
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id.
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earnestly engage in collective bargaining negotiations.135 This tension was
exacerbated by the fact that the vast majority of owners were white, and a
Some
significant majority of players were African American.136
commentators found the dynamic to be reminiscent of the power imbalance
between whites and African Americans dating back to slavery.137 Indeed,
after a federal mediator declared that there was “no useful purpose” for
continuing mediation between the two sides in late October,138 journalist
Bryant Gumbel made the following provocative editorial comments
regarding NBA Commissioner David Stern:
[Stern’s] efforts were typical of a commissioner, who has always
seemed eager to be viewed as some kind of modern plantation
overseer treating NBA men as if they were his boys. It’s part of
Stern’s M.O. Like his past self-serving edicts on dress code or
the questioning of officials, his moves are intended to do little
more than show how he’s the one keeping the hired hands in
their place.139
Gumbel took significant criticism from various analysts—from former
players to sports reporters—for his comments.140 However, others found
135. See Kurt Helin, Players Union VP Mo Evans Still Talking Tough. Great.,
NBCSPORTS (Oct. 13, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/13/playersunion-vp-mo-evans-still-talking-tough-great/.
136. See Mike Wise, NBA Lockout: Negotiations Could Be Hijacked by Racial
Perceptions, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/wizards/
nba-lockout-negotiations-could-be-hijacked-by-racial-perceptions/2011/10/21/gIQAXWyc
3L_story.html (explaining that the negotiating table included owners, with the exception of
Michael Jordan, who were white and ranged in age from forty to eighty, and players who
were 84% African American and in their twenties and thirties).
137. See, e.g., Kurt Helin, Bryant Gumbel Compares David Stern to “Plantation
Overseer”, NBCSPORTS (Oct. 19, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/19/
bryant-gumbel-compares-david-stern-to-%E2%80%9Cplantation-overseer%E2%80%9D/
[hereinafter Helin, Bryant Gumbel Compares].
138. See Kurt Helin, Mediator Says “No Useful Purpose” to Continue Labor Talks,
NBCSPORTS (Oct. 20, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/20/mediatorsays-%E2%80%9Cno-useful-purpose%E2%80%9D-to-continue-labor-talks/
(quoting
federal mediator George Cohen).
139. Helin, Bryant Gumbel Compares, supra note 137 (quoting Gumbel’s closing
comments from an episode of HBO’s Real Sports with Bryant Gumbel).
140. See, e.g., Kurt Helin, Add Barkley to List of People Slamming Bryant Gumbel,
NBCSPORTS (Oct. 20, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/20/addbarkley-to-list-of-people-slamming-bryant-gumbel/ (describing TV analyst and former NBA
player Charles Barkley’s opinion that millionaire basketball players could not be accurately
described as slaves and that the Commissioner was merely doing his job); Shaun Powell,
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truth in Gumbel’s “plantation overseer” remark.141 Both before and after
Gumbel’s comments, many players (and those non-players working with
the NBPA) made similar off-the-record comments.142 Indeed, some saw
racial tensions running through the entire collective bargaining talks and
negotiations.143 One reported instance of conflict between Commissioner
Stern and Dwayne Wade of the Miami Heat demonstrated this view.
During negotiations—and several weeks before Gumbel made his
comments—Stern allegedly pointed his finger at the players at the
bargaining table while making an argument.144 In response, Wade raised
his voice and yelled, “‘You’re not pointing your finger at me. I’m not your
child.’”145 Players—many of whom felt patronized by Stern—reveled in
the news of Wade’s rebuke of the Commissioner.146
These strong feelings about the racial overtones of Stern’s actions should
not necessarily come as a surprise to those who follow the NBA, as there
have been a number of controversies in recent years. The most prominent
one occurred prior to the 2005-06 season when the NBA adopted a dress
code that applies to players when sitting in the stands during a game,
participating in a media interview or in team or league activities or events,
Bryant Gumbel Should’ve Known Better, ESPN (Oct. 24, 2011), http://espn.go.com/newyork/nba/story/_/id/7126679/bryant-gumbel-unfairly-labeled-nba-commissioner-david-stern
(defending Commissioner Stern by calling him “the most progressive commissioner in
sports” and reminding readers that the Commissioner pushed for African American
ownership within the NBA and helped make scores of African American men rich); Mike
Raffone, HBO Sports Must “Get Real” with Bryant Gumbel for NBA Slavery Remarks,
BLEACHERREPORT (Oct. 19, 2011), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/902079-hbo-sportsmust-get-real-with-bryant-gumbel-for-nba-slavery-remarks (disputing Gumbel’s slavery
remark based on players’ salaries).
141. See generally WILLIAM RHODEN, FORTY MILLION DOLLAR SLAVES: THE RISE, FALL,
AND REDEMPTION OF THE BLACK ATHLETE (2006) (arguing that systemic racism endures in
the world of sports because, despite players’ significant salaries, an old dynamic persists:
African American athletes supply the talent—but have little control over their professional
lives—while the rich white owners and officials retain all of the power).
142. Helin, Bryant Gumbel Compares, supra note 137; see also Henry Abbott, David
Stern and the Plantation, ESPN (Oct. 19, 2011), http://espn.go.com/blog/truehoop/post/_/
id/32634/david-stern-and-the-plantation (explaining that persons associated with the players
believed that underlying the dispute was the players’ determination to correct the historically
exploitative relationship between white and African-American men).
143. Abbott, supra note 142.
144. Kurt Helin, Report: Dwyane Wade Yelled at Stern During Labor Talks, NBCSPORTS
(Oct. 1, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/01/report-dwyane-wadeyelled-at-stern-during-labor-talks.
145. Id. (quoting Wade).
146. Id.
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and sitting on the team’s bench during the game when they were ineligible
to play.147 The dress code requires players to wear business casual attire
during these times and explicitly forbids players to wear popular items such
as sleeveless shirts, shorts, T-shirts, jerseys, sunglasses, headphones,
headgear, chains, pendants, or medallions.148
Stern justified the new dress code by arguing that it was appropriate for
players to demonstrate a level of professionalism.149 However, others
viewed the dress code as having racial overtones. One scholar noted that
many of the clothes and accessories that NBA players liked to wear were
banned under the dress code.150 The banned attire (clothing associated with
hip-hop style) was negatively stereotyped and, at the same time, associated
with a particular race—African Americans—and thus “race had to be a
motivating factor and contributed to Commissioner Stern’s decision to
institute a dress code.”151 Indeed, while many supporters of the dress code
never used the words “black” or “African American” when criticizing the
attire that the dress code aimed to eliminate, it was evident that there were
concerns that aspects of African American culture—what many conflated
with hip-hop dress—were deemed problematic for the NBA’s image.152 In
this regard, the dress code and its supporters sought to limit the impact of
young, black players on the NBA culture and to ensure that the players
comported with the views and values of the NBA’s predominantly white
audience.153
NBA players certainly viewed the new dress code in this light. Paul
Pierce argued that the dress code targeted “part of our culture,”154 and one
commentator argued that some players believe players should distinguish
147. Max N. Panoff, Note, Black, Tie Optional: How the NBA’s Dress Code Violates
Title VII, 8 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 275, 278-79 (2009). See generally NBA Player Dress
Code, NBA (Oct. 20, 2005), http://www.nba.com/news/player_dress_code_051017.html
(last visited Aug. 17, 2013).
148. R. Richard Banks, Class and Culture: The Indeterminacy of Nondiscrimination, 5
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 3 (2009); see also NBA Player Dress Code, supra note 147.
149. Jeffrey A. Williams, Flagrant Foul: Racism in “The Ron Artest Fight”, 13 UCLA
ENT. L. REV. 55, 87 (2005).
150. Panoff, supra note 147, at 282.
151. Id.
152. See Peter Hogarth, Racial Ideology and Discourse in the NBA: Ron Artest and the
Construction of Black Bodies by White America, STREAM: CULTURE/POLITICS/TECHNOLOGY,
Spring 2008, at 53, 62, available at http://journals.sfu.ca/cpt/index.php/stream/article%20/
view/5/5.
153. Id. at 60.
154. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Volunteer Discrimination, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1895,
1904 (2007) (quoting Pierce).
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themselves from the negative stereotypes of blacks as being “bad
outsiders.”155 Stephen Jackson echoed this sentiment by claiming that the
dress code made “a racial statement” and that aspects of the requirements—
like banning players from wearing chains—were directly targeted at black
players.156 These racial tensions were only exacerbated by the perception
that white owners, fans, and merchandisers appeared to target the dress of
black athletes.157
Two other controversies that preceded the 2011 Agreement also help
explain why the players felt that race played a role in their negotiations with
the owners. The first was when the NBA banned its players from certain
nightclubs that it deemed ill-suited for players to attend.158 If players
attended one of these nightclubs, they faced league discipline, including a
substantial fine.159 Many viewed the nightclub ban as being paternalistic
and fueling the racial tension between the white owners and African
American players.160 The second controversy involved the NBA’s push for
a minimum age for players—nineteen years old or one year after high
school graduation—which it successfully negotiated into the 2005
Agreement.161 Some scholars viewed this rule as racially motivated.162
Indeed, there is a strong argument that the rule has had a disproportionate
effect on black athletes because none of the players that entered the NBA
draft straight from high school were white.163 One scholar argued that the
155. Id. at 1901.
156. Id. at 1904 (quoting Jackson).
157. Mark R. Bandsuch, The NBA Dress Code and Other Fashion Faux Pas Under Title
VII, 16 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 19 (2009).
158. Brent D. Showalter, Technical Foul: David Stern’s Excessive Use of Rule-Making
Authority, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 205, 212 (2007).
159. Michael R. Wilson, Why So Stern?: The Growing Power of the NBA Commissioner,
7 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 57 (2010).
160. See, e.g., Michael McCann, NBA Activates Its “Security Forces” to Prohibit
Players From Frequenting Nightclubs, SPORTS L. BLOG (Jan. 21, 2007), http://sportslaw.blogspot.com/2007/01/nba-activates-its-security-forces-to.html.
161. Daniel A. Applegate, Comment, The NBA Gets a College Education: An Antitrust
and Labor Analysis of the NBA’s Minimum Age Limit, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 825, 829
(2006).
162. E.g., Scott R. Rosner, Must Kobe Come Out and Play? An Analysis of the Legality
of Preventing High School Athletes and College Underclassmen from Entering Professional
Sports Drafts, 8 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 539, 569-70 (1998); Richard Salgado, A Fiduciary
Duty to Teach Those Who Don’t Want to Learn: The Potentially Dangerous Oxymoron of
“College Sports”, 17 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 135, 146 (2007).
163. Michael A. McCann, Illegal Defense: The Irrational Economics of Banning High
School Players from the NBA Draft, 3 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 113, 163 (2004).
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NBA’s various rationales for the minimum age requirement—the long-term
financial interest of players, the importance of education, and the
immaturity of early draft entrants, and among others—were merely
pretextual for the racist intent behind the rule.164 Players certainly seemed
to view the minimum age requirement as being racist.165
Understandably, these kinds of recent controversies influenced how
players viewed the actions of Commissioner Stern and NBA owners during
the collective bargaining negotiations in 2011. However, the racial tension
between the players and owners can be traced to an ongoing, underlying
power struggle that dates back some fifty years or more. For example, in
1964, NBA players refused to leave their locker room and play in the AllStar game until the NBA recognized the players’ union and promised to
provide a pension plan.166 Similar to the players’ sentiment in 1964, the
players’ perspective during the 2011 lockout may have been not only about
money, but also about power—in particular, the power of the individual
NBA player.167 As one commentator pointed out,
The teams want to be the brand, the product, the market, the
control. They want the players to be the asset, the employee, the
robotic function of the system the team structure creates. You
can argue [the] end point is about money. But it also speaks to
ideological divides over whether the young, yes, in most cases
black athlete should have the strength and power to determine
his or her own basketball destiny.168
Star players such as Kevin Garnett, Carmelo Anthony, and especially
LeBron James fought hard to control their own respective destinies and in
164. Kenneth Casey Allison, Unconscious Racism and the NBA 16-22 (Dec. 4, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1574935.
165. Stern Wants NBA Age Limit Raised to 20, ESPN (Apr. 13, 2005), http://sports.espn.
go.com/nba/news/story?id=2035132.
166. Matt Moore, NBA Lockout: LeBron James and the Kingdom Ruled by Knights,
NBCSPORTS (Oct. 30, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/30/nbalockout-lebron-james-and-the-kingdom-ruled-by-knights/ [hereinafter Moore, NBA Lockout:
LeBron James].
167. Id. (“There’s a common mistake made in regards to these labor disputes, that they
are about one thing. They are about money. They are about pride. They are about power.
They are about labor strength. They are about employer rights. They are about all of these
things, and somewhere running as a vein underneath the black, ashen skin of this decades
long standoff is this: they are about the power of the individual player.”).
168. Id.
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the process disrupted the status quo in the NBA by leaving one team to join
another (either by forcing a trade or via free agency).169
James, in particular, received venomous criticism for choosing to leave
the Cleveland Cavaliers for the Miami Heat in the summer of 2010.170 Part
of this criticism was likely deserved given the questionable way in which he
announced his free agency choice: The Decision.171 At the same time, it is
easy to see how some of the criticism may have been viewed as racially
motivated. For example, Cleveland Cavaliers owner Dan Gilbert’s vitriolic
response to James’s choice of a new team was met with charges by the
Reverend Jesse Jackson that Gilbert had a “slave master mentality” and that
Gilbert viewed James as “a runaway slave.”172 Gilbert denied the charges,
but one thing was clear: he railed vociferously against James’s
empowerment as a free agent to choose where he would play basketball and
earn his living.173 Indeed, as one commentator noted, James built upon the
power of free agency that was fought for by past NBA stars like Bill
Russell and Oscar Robertson, and “showed that a player can enter free
agency, and not only go where he wants, but get a sign-and-trade to get the
extra year he wants on the deal, and do it alongside two of his best
friends.”174 Through his decision, James almost single-handedly shifted the
NBA’s balance of power from Cleveland to Miami.175
Many NBA analysts believed that the owners’ frustration with the
players’ newfound sense of empowerment fueled both the owners’
bargaining positions and several of the more controversial points of
contention during the lockout.176 Indeed, one could easily view the owners’
169. Id.
170. See Matt Moore, Like It or Not, LeBron James’ ‘Decision’ Is All Part of the Plan,
and It’s Working, NBCSPORTS (July 7, 2010), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2010/
07/07/like-it-or-not-lebron-james-decision-is-all-part-of-the-plan-and-its-working/.
171. See Henry Abbott, LeBron James’ Decision: The Transcript, ESPN (July 8, 2010),
http://espn.go.com/blog/truehoop/post/_/id/17853/lebron-james-decision-the-transcript.
172. Bill Hutchinson, Jesse Jackson Slams Cavaliers’ Owner Dan Gilbert for Treating
LeBron James Like a ‘Runaway Slave’, NYDAILYNEWS (July 12, 2010), http://www.
nydailynews.com/news/national/jesse-jackson-slams-cavaliers-owner-dan-gilbert-treatinglebron-james-runaway-slave-article-1.467775 (quoting Rev. Jesse Jackson).
173. See Letter from Dan Gilbert, Owner, Cleveland Cavaliers to Fans (July 8, 2010),
available at http://www.nba.com/cavaliers/news/gilbert_letter_100708.html.
174. Moore, NBA Lockout: LeBron James, supra note 166.
175. Id.
176. See Henry Abbott, The Moment the Talks Fell Apart, ESPN (Oct. 15, 2011), http://
espn.go.com/blog/truehoop/post/_/id/32504/the-moment-the-talks-fell-apart (discussing how
LeBron James waived the status quo with “The Decision,” thus inspiring other players to act
with a similar sense of empowerment during the lockout); Boyce Watkins, Bryant Gumbel,
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desire to shorten player contracts, impose extreme luxury tax penalties,
reform Larry Bird free agency rights, and eliminate sign-and-trade contracts
as not only related to financial concerns, but also motivated by a desire to
collectively regain power and control over the players.177
When
considering such a power struggle, racial implications cannot be
overlooked. They add another dimension to the dynamic—one with
palpable, historical roots.178 When viewed in this context, the parties’
passionate fight over a few percentage points of BRI, and the players’
willingness to lose salary and revenue during the lockout, is more
understandable. At the same time, the players’ repeated insistence on a
“fair deal” also takes on a more complex meaning, with implications
reaching beyond the mere economics of the 2011 Agreement.
This context of the players’ frustrations and the racial overtones of the
collective bargaining negotiations help explain why some viewed the
players as emotional to the point of making irrational decisions regarding
their approach to the lockout and their bargaining position. Some evidence
seems to support this characterization. For example, toward the end of the
lockout, the NBPA faced a critical juncture and, by many accounts, acted
foolishly. On November 10, 2011, during a time of great unrest within the
player ranks,179 Stern sought to circumvent NBPA leadership and persuade
the players directly to accept the owners’ latest offer.180 In a memo that he
posted on NBC.com, Stern explained the offer as having a 50-50 BRI split,
expanding the market for mid-level players, permitting unlimited use of the
Bird free agent exception, allowing sign-and-trade contacts for nontaxpaying teams, and permitting “an active free agent market and greater

David Stern and the NBA Plantation, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 22, 2011, http://www.huffing
tonpost.com/dr-boyce-watkins/bryant-gumbel-nba-plantation_b_1021116.html (“Both the
NCAA and NBA are . . . groups of rich and powerful white men seeking to control the
economic options of a group of young black men. . . . David Stern and men like him are
accustomed to calling the shots and controlling Black men . . . .”).
177. Moore, NBA Lockout: LeBron James, supra note 166 (“It’s fine to market those
stars, to demand they smile for promos, do all the appearances, act and dress the way the
owners need them to in order to make the league more popular. But those same players
can’t control what happens in the league. That has to be the owners’ prerogative, in their
minds.”).
178. Id.
179. See infra text accompanying notes 369-397.
180. Kurt Helin, In Latest Attempt to Sway, David Stern Has Memo for Players,
NBCSPORTS (Nov. 14, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/14/in-latestattempt-to-sway-david-stern-has-memo-for-players/.
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player movement.”181 Stern hoped, in turn, that the rank-and-file players
would pressure the NBPA to convene a vote on the proposed deal.182
The NBPA, instead, avoided such a vote and limited discussion of the
proposal to team representatives and NBPA executive committee
members.183 Many commentators expected that the NBPA would modify
the offer (making it more acceptable to the players), approve the modified
offer, and then send it back to the owners for consideration.184 Or, if it
wanted to reject the offer but attempt to gain leverage on the owners, the
union could have also begun the lengthier, player-initiated vote on
decertification.185 However, there is no evidence that the union carefully
considered these alternatives. Instead—and to the surprise of many—on
November 14, 2011, the team representatives rejected the latest offer and
started the union decertification process by sending the NBA a notice of
disclaimer (stating that it would no longer represent players in the collective
bargaining negotiations).186
Players hired attorneys and became
181. Id.
182. Kurt Helin, Powerpoint Version of League’s Offer Players Will Soon Reject,
NBCSPORTS (Nov. 14, 2011) http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/14/powerpointversion-of-leagues-offer-players-will-soon-reject/ [hereinafter Helin, Powerpoint Version].
183. Kurt Helin, Stern Gives Players New Ultimatum Offer for 72-Game Season,
NBCSPORTS (Nov. 10, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/10/sterngives-players-new-ultimatum-offer-for-72-game-season/ [hereinafter Helin, Stern Gives
Players New Ultimatum].
184. Helin, Powerpoint Version, supra note 182.
185. Helin, Players’ Idea to Decertify, supra note 114. The player-initiated vote on
decertification is a different process for decertification than the disclaimer of interest
approach. Id.
186. See Kurt Helin, Players Vote to Reject Offer, Decertify Union. Season Likely
Doomed., NBCSPORTS (Nov. 14, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/14/
players-vote-to-reject-offer-disband-union-season-likely-doomed/
[hereinafter
Helin,
Players Vote to Reject Offer]. Employees can choose to dissolve their union either through
decertification or by a disclaimer of interest. Gabriel Feldman, Antitrust Versus Labor Law
in Professional Sports: Balancing the Scales After Brady v. NFL and Anthony v. NBA, 45
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1221, 1255-56 (2012). Decertification requires that 30% or more of
union members sign cards stating that they do not want their union to continue to represent
them. Id. at 1256 n.197. An election is thus held, and if a majority of employees votes to
decertify the union, the employees will no longer be represented by the union after the vote.
Id. A disclaimer of interest, on the other hand, “occurs when a showing has been made that
more than 50% of the employees in the union do not wish to be represented by the union.”
Id. The NBPA was under intense pressure to decertify at this point of the lockout. See Kurt
Helin, Where Things Stand as Kobe, Stars Show up for Union Meeting, NBCSPORTS (Nov.
14, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/14/where-things-stand-as-kobestars-show-up-for-union-meeting/ (explaining that the hard-liners within the union claimed
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plaintiffs.187 The NBPA was forced to withdraw its unfair labor practices
complaint against the owners, and it was expected that the league would
challenge the disclaimer of interest as a sham.188
Indeed, those following the lockout viewed decertification as a
negotiating tactic on the part of the players to move the owners off of their
hardline bargaining stance.189 The union also had strategic reasons for the
disclaimer of interest; it thought that such a move would satisfy the hardline
players and agents.190 Interestingly, many agents that represented players
were actually shocked that the union chose the disclaimer of interest
method of decertification.191 One reason for this surprise was that the
disclaimer of interest approach proceeds rather quickly—which would seem
to be against the players’ interest.192 If the players had, instead, petitioned
for a vote on decertification, there would have been a forty-five day period
before the actual vote.193 This time period could have then been used for
further negotiations with the owners—with the leverage of the looming
decertification vote.194 Instead, the union may have purposely avoided the
player-initiated method for fear that once the players convened for the vote,
they would have rejected decertification and accepted Stern’s latest
proposal—something that union leadership did not want the players to
do.195
to have seventy more player signatures on a petition than it needed for a vote to decertify but
said that they would wait until the union meeting had occurred before filing the papers).
187. Helin, Players Vote to Reject Offer, supra note 186.
188. See Kurt Helin, Fisher, Hunter Send Letter to Players Explaining Process,
NBCSPORTS (Nov. 14, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/14/fisherhunter-send-letter-to-players-explaining-process/ [hereinafter Helin, Fisher, Hunter Send
Letter]. If the NBPA had been successful in its unfair labor practices complaint, the
National Labor Relations Board may have attempted to enjoin the NBA from continuing the
lockout. See Grow, supra note 3, at 495.
189. See, e.g., Helin, Fisher, Hunter Send Letter, supra note 188.
190. Matt Moore, Stern Responds to Allegations He’s Not Bluffing by Saying He’s Not
Bluffing, NBCSPORTS (Nov. 13, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/13/
stern-responds-to-allegations-hes-not-bluffing-by-saying-hes-not-bluffing/.
191. Liz Mullin, Agents Surprised by Disclaimer, Keep Options Open, SPORTS BUS. J.
(Nov. 21, 2011), http://m.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2011/11/21/Labor-andAgents/NBA-agents.aspx.
192. Helin, Players’ Idea to Decertify, supra note 114.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Kurt Helin, NBA Union Did Not Poll Players Before Taking Big Step Monday,
NBCSPORTS (Nov. 14, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/14/nba-uniondid-not-poll-players-before-taking-big-step-monday/ [hereinafter Helin, NBA Union Did Not
Poll Players].

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss1/1

2014]

LESSONS FROM THE NBA LOCKOUT

33

When the media questioned the disclaimer of interest method, union
leadership claimed that it was the players’ idea to decertify.196 This
response made many question whether the players really understood the
ramifications of filing a disclaimer of interest.197 In fact, one commentator
portrayed the player representatives as naïve and unsophisticated, with not
many of them “know[ing] the difference between a disclaimer of interest,
decertification and ‘Dancing with the Stars.’”198 Some players seemed to
validate this view. For example, Paul Pierce—an informal leader among
the players behind the push to decertify—when asked whether he agreed
with the disclaimer of interest, said that he was not sure if it was the right
move.199 Pierce seemed to defer to the expertise of NBPA Executive
Director Billy Hunter and the union’s lawyers.200 More importantly, Pierce
later appeared to indicate that the players were frustrated and may have
acted rashly without thinking through the decision:
I don’t know if [disclaimer of interest is] the right move or
[forced] decertification is the right move or sitting at the table is
the right move. We weren’t getting nowhere at the negotiation
table. The players felt like they were giving, giving, giving
while the owners were taking all the concessions.201
In this regard, the disclaimer of interest decision could easily be viewed as
stemming from the players’ sense of powerlessness and frustration—and
deference to union leadership—rather than from an informed decisionmaking process. In light of the historic power imbalance between the
owners and players and the racial tensions that flared at various points
during the negotiations and in the past between the two sides, one might
also fairly view the players’ decision as a rash and perhaps irrational

196. Helin, Players’ Idea to Decertify, supra note 114.
197. Id.
198. Adrian Wojnarowski, Stern, Hunter Lose Sight of NBA Season, YAHOO (Nov. 15,
2011), http://sports.yahoo.com/nba/news?slug=aw-wojnarowski_nba_labor_players_owners
_111511 (“As it usually goes in labor talks, whoever gets the players’ ears last can talk them
in and out of almost any directive. The agents were locked out, cell phone confiscated at the
door, and Hunter had a captive audience with some big fancy antitrust lawyers to make his
case.”).
199. Marc J. Spears, Paul Pierce: Players Need to Make Stand, YAHOO (Nov. 20, 2011),
http://sports.yahoo.com/nba/news;_ylt=AnqURQ15UKkkyBGD_cg03fG8vLYF?slug=mcspears_paul_pierce_celtics_nba_lockout_111911.
200. See id.
201. Id. (quoting Pierce).
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response to the negative emotions they felt about the complicated clash they
experienced over the past fifty years.
IV. Alternative, Complementary Explanations
The foregoing explanations for why the players ended up with such
unfavorable terms in the 2011 Agreement are dominant in the public
narrative regarding the lockout and its fallout. However, there are also
alternative, complementary explanations for the players’ subpar results.
Research in the fields of labor law, industrial relations, and communications
helps provide a robust and insightful framework through which to better
understand the folly of the NBPA. Specifically, understanding the role of
union democracy and public support—with a special emphasis on an
effective media strategy and public relations campaign—helps provide a
fuller accounting of the results of the lockout and the 2011 Agreement.
A. Gaining Public Support Through an Effective Public Relations
Campaign
1. Context and Examples
Industrial relations scholarship provides key insight as to the importance
of public support and an effective public relations campaign during
collective bargaining and, in particular, during a lockout or strike. Both
union leaders and management know that swaying public opinion in their
favor oftentimes leads to leverage at the bargaining table.202 Public support
may, in fact, be most important during times of labor strife.203 Labor
202. See Michael H. LeRoy, Joshua L. Schwarz & Karen S. Koziara, The Law and
Economics of Collective Bargaining for Hospitals: An Empirical Public Policy Analysis of
Bargaining Unit Determinations, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 4 n.6 (1992) (noting how unions
prioritize public support when preparing for a strike, including providing union members
with strike manuals that have instructions as to how to win over the public).
203. See GLENN M. WONG, ESSENTIALS OF SPORTS LAW 526 (4th ed. 2010). See generally
AMIE E. BERGIN, WHAT EFFECTS DO PUBLIC RELATIONS ACTIONS HAVE ON LABOR DISPUTES?
A LOOK AT CORPORATE CAMPAIGNS (Schmidt Labor Res. Ctr. Seminar Paper Ser., 2005),
available at http://www.uri.edu/research/lrc/research/papers/Bergin_Campaigns.pdf; In
Labor Strike Situations, PR Powers Both Sides of Dispute, PR NEWS (PR News Grp.,
Rockville, Md.), Nov. 25, 2002 [hereinafter In Labor Strike Situations], available at
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-94607164.html (noting that public sympathy for the
union can be used to place pressure on management). During a labor dispute, both sides also
communicate with each other through the media in addition to trying to garner public
support for their position. See Jim McCafferty, Labor-Management Dispute Resolution &
the Media, 56 DISP. RESOL. J. 41, 42 (2001) (providing examples where union members used
the media to voice dissatisfaction with an employer’s offer and the employer communicated
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disputes are “[public relations] battle[s] that require the skills of the most
savvy communicators,”204 and “[a]ny union in today’s society that doesn’t
have good communication with its members and the public will not
survive.”205 The stakes may be even higher for unions as they enter
collective bargaining negotiations because they tend to start at a
disadvantage from a public support standpoint, as the general public tends
to have a negative view of unions.206 This public support deficit stems from
a gradual decline in union membership over the past forty years and the
media coverage of unions that has tended to involve stories of corruption,
crime, greed, and violent strikes.207
Given the importance of public support, management and labor focus
more intently on crafting and executing an effective public relations
strategy, though each side often takes a slightly different approach.
Management generally tends to stay positive—in an attempt to expand on
its built-in advantage with the public’s negative sentiment toward unions—
while unions oftentimes go negative by painting management in an
unsympathetic light.208 Unions rely progressively more on public relations
campaigns, or “corporate campaigns,” to put pressure on employers
because the traditional leverage unions had (the strike) is no longer as
effective as it once was.209 The relative ineffectiveness of strikes has been
due to a decline in union membership, the possibility of losing more public
support through a strike, and the looming threat of replacement workers.210
Accordingly, unions devise public relations campaigns to pressure the
employers’ stakeholders—such as its customers, investors, board of
directors, lenders, and suppliers—who, in turn, will sway the employers to

several messages to the union through the media; the employer told the media that it was
prepared for a long strike and that a strike would result in a contract that was less favorable
to workers; and the employer used the media to leak some details from its “final” offer to the
union).
204. In Labor Strike Situations, supra note 203.
205. WILLIAM J. PUETTE, THROUGH JAUNDICED EYES: HOW THE MEDIA VIEW ORGANIZED
LABOR 143 (1992) (quoting a communications director for the United Steelworkers union).
206. BERGIN, supra note 203, at 2.
207. See PAUL F. CLARK, BUILDING MORE EFFECTIVE UNIONS 127-28 (2000) (discussing
a Gallup poll showing that only 26% of the public had confidence in unions as an
institution); Diane E. Schmidt, Public Opinion and Media Coverage of Labor Unions, 14 J.
OF LAB. RES. 151, 152-53 (1993) (citing to Gallup polls taken from 1947 to 1985).
208. See In Labor Strike Situations, supra note 203.
209. BERGIN, supra note 203, at 2.
210. See Ann C. Hodges, Mediation and the Transformation of American Labor Unions,
69 MO. L. REV. 365, 374-75 (2004).
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reach agreement with the unions.211 These corporate campaigns attempt to
seize the public’s attention and generate sympathy for the union workers
through strategies such as “litigation, regulatory complaints, political
appeals, advertisements, press conferences, rallies, and even street
theater.”212
Unions also form coalitions with civil rights groups,
community organizations, and religious leaders to help increase pressure on
the employers’ stakeholders.213 If successful, such corporate campaigns can
become more than just an employer-employee matter, rising to a
community, regional, state, or even national issue.214 The broader the
media and public attention—assuming it is positive to the workers’
position—the greater the leverage the union will have in its collective
bargaining negotiations and labor dispute.
Management, on the other hand, usually approaches this negative
publicity in one of two ways. First, the employer may respond by adversely
portraying the union.215 Management might imply that the striking workers
are greedy and release supporting information showing that the workers are
highly paid within the region for that type of work.216 In addition, the
employer may attempt to portray the union members as outsiders or
troublemakers—“those people.”217 Second, management may choose not to
go negative but instead release factual information that counters the union’s
corporate campaign attacks.218
Two union public relations campaigns stand out as particularly effective
and demonstrate what is needed to win over public support and use it
advantageously in collective bargaining negotiations. The first is the
Justice for Janitors campaign from 1990 to 2000 in Los Angeles.219 The

211. See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 1527, 1605 (2002).
212. Michael M. Oswalt, Steeple Solidarity: Mainline Church Renewal and the Union
Corporate Campaign, 50 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 227, 252 (2011).
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. In Labor Strike Situations, supra note 203.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See Ryan Ellis, Unions Use Smear Tactics in ‘Corporate Campaigns’, 63 HUMAN
EVENTS 15, 20 (2007), available at http://www.humanevents.com/2007/04/23/unions-usesmear-tactics-in-corporate-campaigns/ (describing Wal-Mart’s creation of a website to post
facts designed to refute claims made by a union).
219. Christopher L. Erickson et al., Justice for Janitors in Los Angeles: Lessons from
Three Rounds of Negotiations, 40 BRIT. J. OF INDUS. REL. 543, 544 (2002) (calling the Justice
for Janitors campaign “arguably the single most important organizing success story of the
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Justice for Janitors campaign garnered much media attention and gained
significant public support through peaceful and orderly protests and rallies
strategically located outside of the buildings that the janitors cleaned.220
The campaign was successful because the janitors’ union—the Service
Employees International Union (SEIU)—was well-prepared and planned
for the campaign far in advance. Even a year before the first strike, SEIU
carefully constructed a persuasive public relations strategy by conducting
polls and focus groups.221 The union also considered the greater political
and economic context of the labor dispute. For example, despite the
economic growth enjoyed by the Los Angeles region—particularly in and
around the time of the campaign—there was still a tremendous economic
gap between the affluent and the poor in the area.222 SEIU saw the
opportunity to make the janitors symbols of this economic inequality: lowwage, immigrant laborers who worked nights to clean the upscale buildings
of the wealthy elite’s daytime offices.223 At the same time that SEIU waged
the Justice for Janitors campaign, California passed an anti-undocumented
immigrant initiative—Proposition 187—which generated a great deal of
sympathy for low-wage, immigrant workers.224
The Justice for Janitors’ media campaign message of seeking justice for
the working poor resonated with the public in Los Angeles’s economic and
political climate.225 The media’s extensive coverage of the campaign was

U.S. labour movement in the late twentieth century”). The Justice for Janitors campaign
eventually spread to other cities as well. Id.
220. Michael M. Oswalt, Note, The Grand Bargain: Revitalizing Labor Through NLRA
Reform and Radical Workplace Relations, 57 DUKE L.J. 691, 708 (2007).
221. Erickson et al., supra note 219, at 553.
222. See id. at 562-63. During this time, Californians also adopted Proposition 210,
which raised the minimum wage in the state, and many cities passed living wage ordinances.
Id. For more background on local living wage ordinances, see David Neumark, Living
Wages: Protection for or Protection from Low-Wage Workers?, 58 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
27, 28-29 (2004) (detailing various living wage laws in the United States).
223. See Erickson et al., supra note 219, at 553.
224. Id. at 562.
225. See id. (noting that “[m]uch of the union’s negotiating leverage came from the
strong public sentiment supporting the janitors’ efforts, not from preventing buildings from
being cleaned”). For more information regarding the importance of the political context of
union efforts, see Preston Rudy, “Justice for Janitors,” Not “Compensation for
Custodians”: The Political Context and Organizing in San Jose and Sacramento, in
REBUILDING LABOR: ORGANIZING AND ORGANIZERS IN THE NEW UNION MOVEMENT 133, 134
(Ruth Milkman & Kim Voss eds., 2004) (arguing that the Justice for Janitors’ union
organizing campaigns in San Jose and Sacramento demonstrated that unions’ ability to
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sympathetic to the union and its members, as was public sentiment.226 In
response to this public support, elected officials from both political parties
and community leaders expressed support for the janitors and even
intervened in the dispute.227 This intense public scrutiny led the employers
to resolve the strike with terms that were highly favorable to the janitors.228
The second noteworthy union public relations campaign was the
Teamsters-UPS strike in 1997. Similar to the Justice for Janitors campaign,
the Teamsters union prepared more than a year in advance for the strike.229
The union surveyed its members and discovered that its membership was
concerned about the lack of full-time positions available to them.230 In
response, the Teamsters leadership designed a message to appeal to its
members and the public more generally.231 The union condemned UPS’s
employment of a substantial (and growing) number of part-time workers
and used effective slogans, such as “Part-time America won’t work”232 and
“People don’t have part-time children or part-time mortgages,”233 to
communicate their message. These slogans caught the public’s attention
because the economic recession in the early 1990s had left the general
public with a negative view of big business and hostility toward the rapidly
increasing incidence of part-time (rather than full-time) jobs.234 The public
feared corporate downsizing and worried that there would be a continued
loss of full-time jobs—with wages and benefits to support a family—and a
rise, instead, of part-time, low-wage jobs with no benefits.235 The public
was particularly hostile to this trend because it coincided with a rise in
corporate profits and a once-again robust economy.236
“strategiz[e] their relationship with the political context” is determinative of the outcome of
such campaigns).
226. Erickson et al., supra note 219, at 562.
227. Id. at 563-64.
228. Id. at 564.
229. Kate Miller, Issues Management: The Link Between Organization Reality and
Public Perception, 44 PUB. REL. Q. 5 (1999).
230. CHRISTOPHER R. MARTIN, FRAMED!: LABOR AND THE CORPORATE MEDIA 164 (2004)
(explaining that UPS instituted a two-tier wage system that paid part-time workers less than
half of the wages of full-time workers, despite these part-time workers working thirty-five or
more hours per week).
231. See id.
232. Id.
233. William Schneider, A Turning Point for American Labor?, 29 NAT’L J. 1711 (1997).
234. See id. (noting that the union’s message “touched on widespread worker
insecurities—and resentment of corporate downsizing”).
235. See MARTIN, supra note 230, at 168-69.
236. See id. at 168-69, 173.
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The Teamsters publicized their message through rallies, press releases,
and other events aimed at gaining news coverage.237 The union also
prepared its members to communicate effectively with their customers
regarding the union’s position.238 Indeed, the UPS drivers—themselves
union members—had face-to-face interactions with customers during
deliveries, and these communications helped contribute to the strong public
support that the Teamsters were able to garner during the strike.239 The
public support was particularly impressive—polling showed 55% supported
the union compared to 27% supporting UPS—given that the public suffered
some inconvenience in disruptions in service by the nation’s largest
shipping company.240 With such strong public backing, the union was able
to pressure UPS to reach a favorable settlement a mere fifteen days after
beginning the strike.241
As these two examples demonstrate, effective public relations campaigns
can help unions gain leverage over management and secure a more
desirable outcome for their members. Indeed, these corporate campaigns
have been valuable even for unions that have not enjoyed the same kind of
national media attention as the Justice for Janitors and Teamsters
campaigns.242 Such success stories demonstrate that preparation is key to
the union efforts. In the two examples above, the unions thoroughly
researched the employers and the related industries. They also crafted their
public relations messaging in light of the political and economic climate at
the time. Each union’s leadership then educated their respective members
about the employer, the industry, the union’s positions, and the methods
and messages for dealing with the media and the public. The unions next
used various strategies—such as face-to-face contacts, rallies, protests,
press conferences, and other events aimed at attracting news coverage—for
disseminating their message. In doing so, the unions developed and
effectively communicated messages that resonated with their members and

237. Miller, supra note 229, at 5-11.
238. BERGIN, supra note 203 (citing Frederick Guy, High-Involvement Work Practices
and Employee Bargaining Power, 25 EMP. REL. 453, 460 (2003)).
239. MARTIN, supra note 230, at 171.
240. Schneider, supra note 234, at 1711.
241. See MARTIN, supra note 230, at 165.
242. See, e.g., Charles Craypo, Strike and Relocation in Meatpacking, in GRAND
DESIGNS: THE IMPACT OF CORPORATE STRATEGIES ON WORKERS, UNIONS, AND COMMUNITIES
185, 203-04 (Charles Craypo & Bruce Nissen eds., 1993) (describing the Commercial
Workers International Union’s public relations campaign success against IBP—a
meatpacking corporation—in Dakota City, Nebraska).
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with the public at large. This public support, in turn, helped these unions
secure favorable terms in their new contracts with their employers.
2. The NBPA Public Relations Debacle
In most respects, the need for a players’ union—like the NBPA—to
properly prepare and execute an effective public relations campaign during
labor strife is no different than that of other unions. Despite the popularity
of professional athletes and the ease with which they can access media
outlets,243 the public generally is as unsympathetic to professional athletes
during labor disputes as it often is with the union position in other
industries.244 The public commonly views work stoppages in professional
sports—whether due to strike or lockout—as related to the greed of both
sides (with particular disdain for the players) and thus reacts with
resentment and disgust.245 In particular, the resentment towards the players
may be even more acute when the media portrays them as privileged
individuals who make their living playing a sport—in contrast to the
owners, who are seen as businesspersons.246 Given this context, it is critical
for players’ unions like the NBPA to craft a message that will resonate with
the general public.
The NBA players faced a predictable deficit in public support when the
lockout began. The public had trouble relating to millionaire young men—
most of whom were in their twenties—and thus felt little sympathy for
them.247 It certainly did not help that the players—and, more specifically,
their salaries—were known (or easily ascertainable) by the public. In
contrast, the owners were faceless and their incomes largely unknown.248
243. See DAVID F. PRINDLE, THE POLITICS OF GLAMOUR: IDEOLOGY AND DEMOCRACY IN
3 (1988).
244. See Michelle Hertz, Note, The National Basketball Association and the National
Basketball Players Association Opt to Cap Off the 1988 Collective Bargaining Agreement
with a Full Court Press: In re Chris Dudley, 5 MARQ. SPORTS L. J. 251, 272 n.145 (1995)
(explaining that the public had no sympathy for the NFL, MLB, NHL, or the respective
players’ union in their various bargaining disputes during the mid-1990s).
245. Id.
246. See, e.g., Aaron Shepard, Comment, Football’s Stormy Future: Forecasting the
Upcoming National Football League Labor Negotiations, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 527, 531
(2010) (discussing NFL players in particular).
247. See Kurt Helin, Love Says Players Want Compromise but Will Not Roll Over,
NBCSPORTS (Aug. 17, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/08/17/love-saysplayers-want-compromise-but-will-not-roll-over/.
248. See Kurt Helin, Stern Goes on the Offensive During Media Tour, NBCSPORTS (Oct.
14,
2011),
http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/14/david-stern-goes-on-theoffensive-during-media-tour/ [hereinafter Helin, Stern Goes on the Offensive].
THE SCREEN ACTORS GUILD
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This dynamic helps explain, in part, why the public seemed generally to
resent the millionaire players more than the billionaire owners.249 Part of
this public resentment grew from the debate surrounding nonguaranteed
contracts. In particular, there was a focus in the media coverage on the
“malingering player”—those players who signed lucrative, long-term
guaranteed contracts and then either underperformed or missed many
games due to injury.250 Commissioner Stern certainly fueled this perception
in his public relations strategy, as it tended to reinforce the public’s already
negative perceptions of the players.251
Some players and commentators pushed back against this
characterization of the players. NBPA President Derek Fisher argued that
while a few players were overpaid, others (like 2010-11 NBA MVP Derrick
Rose) were actually paid below their market value.252 Others argued that it
made little sense to blame the players for signing and continuing to collect
on contracts to which general managers and owners agreed.253 Relatedly,
some commentators pointed out that the “bad” contracts had no actual
effect on the league’s finances because under the 2005 Agreement, the
players received 57% of BRI—so the amount of money paid to the players
249. See id.
250. Kurt Helin, Who Are the Most Overpaid Players in the NBA?, NBCSPORTS (July 5,
2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/05/who-are-the-most-overpaid-play
ers-in-the-nba/ (listing and explaining one sport writer’s list of players with these types of
contracts); Ian Thomsen, Union President Fisher Maintains Bold Stance in Labor
Negotiations, SI (July 21, 2011), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/writers/ian_thomsen/
07/21/derek.fisher/index.html?eref=writers (explaining that players call these types of
occurrences “stealing the money”).
251. See Andrew Sharp, NBA Lockout: David Stern Calls Agents Greedy, One Agent
Responds, SBNATION (Nov. 14, 2011), http://www.sbnation.com/2011/11/14/2560543/nbalockout-david-stern-agents-greedy.
252. Kurt Helin, Derek Fisher Talks Lockout, Sounds Like a Politician, NBCSPORTS
(July 5, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/05/derek-fisher-talks-lockoutsounds-like-a-politician/; Kurt Helin, Rose Wants to Do Away with Salary Cap. Of Course
He Does., NBCSPORTS (Oct. 26, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/26/
rose-wants-to-do-away-with-salary-cap-of-course-he-does/ (noting that Rose earned $5.6
million during the 2010-11 season in which he was named the league’s most valuable
player); see also Adrian Wojnarowski, Salaries Don’t Match Value for NBA Stars, YAHOO
(Sept. 30, 2011), http://sports.yahoo.com/nba/news?slug=aw-wojnarowski_dwyane_wade_
nba_lockout_093011 (reporting that Los Angeles Lakers owner Jerry Buss stated privately
that Kobe Bryant—who made a league-high $25 million salary for the 2010-11 NBA
season—was worth $70 million per season to the team).
253. Kurt Helin, Rashard Lewis: Don’t Blame Me for Signing a Huge Contract,
NBCSPORTS (Sept. 13, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/09/13/rashardlewis-don’t-blame-me-for-signing-a-huge-contract/.
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each year would be the same whether such “bad” contracts were made or
not.254
The owners, on the other hand, approached this matter differently. The
owners downplayed their poor management decisions—in agreeing to these
“bad” contracts for malingering players—and, instead, advanced public
rhetoric stereotyping the overpaid, underperforming player.255 As a result,
the players’ fight was futile. Even in these instances where the players had
good facts or arguments on their side, a combination of the public’s
tendency to demonize the players and the ineffectiveness (and perhaps
ineptitude) of the NBPA’s public relations campaign strategy spelled doom
for the union in the court of public opinion.
Indeed, the NBA (the owners) clearly outmaneuvered the NBPA in the
public relations battle and the realm of public opinion. The NBA, in a
savvy move, set up a Twitter account—@NBA_Labor—in order to
communicate directly with fans during the lockout.256 But perhaps more
importantly, the NBA spoke almost exclusively with one voice—that of
Commissioner Stern—and with very consistent messaging.257 Stern was
constantly spinning the story of the lockout to the players’ disadvantage.258
He blamed the players for causing the lockout—despite the lockout being
the owners’ decision—and portrayed the NBA as an enterprise struggling

254. Tim Donahue, CBA Talk: The System, Not Stupid Contracts, Creates Wasted
Payroll, EIGHTPOINTSNINESECONDS (July 26, 2011), http://www.eightpointsnineseconds.
com/2011/07/the-system-not-stupid-contracts-creates-wasted-payroll/; Kurt Helin, Those
Terrible NBA Contracts Are Not Why There Is a Lockout, NBCSPORTS (July 26, 2011),
http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/26/those-terrible-nba-contracts-are-not-whythere-is-a-lockout/.
255. Andrew Sharp, Rashard Lewis on the NBA Lockout: ‘Talk to the Owner, He Gave
Me the Deal’, SBNATION (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.sbnation.com/nba/2011/9/22/2442
215/nba-lockout-rashard-lewis-contract-las-vegas.
256. Tiffany A. Miao, Note, Access Denied: How Social Media Accounts Fall Outside
the Scope of Intellectual Property Law and into the Realm of the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1017, 1019 (2013). The players, on the
other hand, did not use social media as effectively and likely even hurt the union’s
bargaining position with some of the tweets that individual players sent. See infra text
accompanying notes 273-276.
257. Michael Rosenberg, Owner Faction Holds Key to Ending Labor Strife, Salvaging
Season, SI (Sept. 28, 2011), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/writers/michael_rosen
berg/09/28/lockout/.
258. See Lockout Roundtable: Discussing NBA’s Labor Feud, Near Future, SI (Oct. 14,
2011), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/basketball/nba/10/13/lockout.roundtable/.
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economically.259 Stern also faulted the players for the parties’ inability to
reach an agreement and end the lockout, claiming that the players were not
serious about negotiations.260 His arguments and messaging were so
effective in public perception that one commentator stated that Stern
“cherry pick[ed] facts. . . in a way that [made him sound] more reasonable
than the owners actually [were].”261
As the lockout wore on, Stern continued to portray the players as
unreasonable and pointed to “concessions” that the owners were making in
an attempt to make a deal and end the lockout.262 He pointed to such
concessions as retaining guaranteed contracts for players and abandoning
the hard salary cap.263 Seen through another lens, however, the owners had
not actually conceded anything because a hard salary cap and
nonguaranteed contracts were not included in the 2005 Agreement nor had
they been a part of any agreement between the two sides during the
negotiations for the 2011 Agreement.264 Nevertheless, Stern’s message
seemed to resonate with the public. This may be due, in part, to the fact
that the union took a rather civil tone in their public relations campaign and
did a poor job of educating, or generating sympathy from, the public.265
Moreover, the NBPA’s general professional restraint seemed to be too
weak a response to Stern’s “all-out offensive.”266 Even some players could
259. Kurt Helin, Stern Pessimistic, Rips Players After Negotiating Session, NBCSPORTS
(Aug. 1, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/08/01/stern-pessimistic-ripsplayers-after-negotiating-session/ [hereinafter Helin, Stern Pessimistic]. For example,
Commissioner Stern would point to how expensive franchises were to purchase and the
economic losses sustained by many teams. Helin, Stern Goes on the Offensive, supra note
248. He blamed these circumstances on the fact that the players’ salaries went from one
billion dollars in 1999 to more than two billion dollars in 2011. Id. In framing the debate
this way, Stern omitted the fact that player salaries had doubled because league revenue had
doubled and the owners had agreed to this split in revenue for players’ salaries with the 57%
BRI in the 2005 Agreement. Id.
260. Helin, Stern Pessimistic, supra note 259.
261. Helin, Stern Goes on the Offensive, supra note 248.
262. See Henry Abbott, The Concessions That Matter, ESPN (Oct. 7, 2011), http://espn.
go.com/blog/truehoop/post/_/id/32359/the-concessions-that-matter (quoting Commissioner
Stern’s comments at a news conference).
263. Id.
264. See 2005 Agreement, supra note 10.
265. See Dave D’Allesandro, D’Allesandro: In NBA Lockout, Players’ Side Needs to
Speak Up, NJ.COM (Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.nj.com/nets/index.ssf/2011/08/dalessandro_
in_nba_lockout_pla.html.
266. Rob Mahoney, Players Have Avoided Getting Their Hands Dirty, but Will the PR
High Road Pay Off?, NBCSPORTS (Oct. 15, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/
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not help but acknowledge how effective Stern was: Dwayne Wade
described Stern’s public relations efforts as “amazing” and stated that “the
NBA has done . . . a great job complaining. We haven’t done a great job of
that so no one sees our side.”267
While there may be some truth to Wade’s statement, the public relations
gaffes of several individual players also hurt the NBPA’s overall media
strategy.268 The union attempted to avoid such problems within the fiftysix-page instructional “Lockout Handbook” that featured public relations
guidelines and talking points, with a reminder to “[p]lease be sensitive
about interviews or other media displays of a luxurious lifestyle.”269
Nevertheless, comments like that from Rajon Rondo that he was having the
“best summer of [his] life”270 made it difficult for out-of-work fans—many
of whom were still struggling from the effects of the Great Recession—to
relate to, and sympathize with, the players. Steve Nash also made an
unwise statement when he analyzed the lockout by saying, “You have two
wealthy sides arguing over percentage points . . . both sides are arguing for
inevitably selfish reasons.”271 While Nash’s comment may have been an
honest—and perhaps accurate—assessment of the lockout, it only seemed
to add to the public perception that the players were petty.
More importantly, the players’ efforts to counter and correct
Commissioner Stern’s public relations offensive were ineffective. The
union attempted to reframe the public debate by claiming they merely
wanted a fair deal.272 The players even launched a “Let Us Play” public

2011/10/15/players-have-avoided-getting-their-hands-dirty-but-will-the-pr-high-road-payoff/.
267. Id. (quoting Wade).
268. See infra text accompanying notes 270-271.
269. Howard Beck, Public Relations Becomes a Concern When NBA Millionaires Spar,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2011, at B13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/29/sports/
basketball/nba-players-avoid-displays-of-luxury.html?_r=0.
270. Gary Washburn, Rondo Raring to Go: Celtics Guard Has Kept Busy, BOSTON.COM
(Oct. 16, 2011), http://articles.boston.com/2011-10-16/sports/30286915_1_rajon-rondoceltics-guard-lockout (quoting Rondo).
271. Paul Coro, Phoenix Suns Star Steve Nash Calls Owners, Players ‘Selfish’,
AZCENTRAL (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.azcentral.com/sports/suns/articles/2011/11/02/
20111102phoenix-suns-steve-nash-nba-lockout.html (quoting Nash).
272. See Kurt Helin, Players Talk Lockout, Sticking Together at Durant’s Event,
NBCSPORTS (Oct. 24, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/24/playerstalk-lockout-sticking-together-at-durant’s-event/ (quoting Chris Paul as saying that the
players “just want[ed] a fair deal”); Max Minsker, NBA Lockout: Anthony Tolliver Talks to
B/R About Potential End to the Lockout, BLEACHERREPORT (Oct. 31, 2011),
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relations campaign on Twitter in the hopes of turning the public’s negative
sentiment against the owners by blaming the league for the games that had
been canceled up until that point (the preseason games).273 On October 10,
2011, more than one hundred players either tweeted “LET US PLAY
#StandUnited” or other similar messages.274 The next day, Stern canceled
the first two weeks of the regular season, and the players again responded
on Twitter.275 In their tweets, many players blamed the owners for the
canceled games, thanked the fans for their support, apologized to arena
employees who were out of work because of the lockout, and accused Stern
of disseminating propaganda and misinformation.276
Interestingly, despite this concerted and deliberate effort, the “Let Us
Play” campaign did little to increase public sympathy for the players.277
The NBPA—unlike the SEIU and the Teamsters—had not properly
considered the economic climate of 2011. Members of the public, many of
whom were struggling to pay their bills in the aftermath of the Great
Recession, found the players’ argument that they “just wanted to play”
entirely unpersuasive.278 If the players had merely wanted to play, they
could have simply accepted the owners’ most recent offer—an offer that
still would have afforded the players income greater than 99% of
Americans.279 Indeed, it was apparent to most observers that the players
wanted to do more than play; they also sought to advance their financial
interests—and tried to do so by garnering public support through the public
relations campaign.280 The “Let Us Play” campaign thus came off as
disingenuous and proved counterproductive by alienating the public further
from the players.281
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/912706-nba-lockout-anthony-tolliver-talks-to-br-aboutpotential-end-to-the-lockout (quoting Anthony Tolliver as saying the same).
273. Kurt Helin, NBA Players Launch “Let Us Play” Twitter Campaign, NBCSPORTS
(Oct. 10, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/10/nba-players-launch-“letus-play”-twitter-campaign/.
274. Id.
275. Chris Richardson, NBA Cancels Regular Season Games, NBA Players React on
Twitter, WEBPRONEWS (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.webpronews.com/nba-cancels-regularseason-games-nba-players-react-on-twitter-2011-10.
276. Id.
277. Kurt Helin, Players Union to Host Meeting in Los Angeles Friday, NBCSPORTS
(Oct. 11, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/11/players-union-to-hostmeeting-in-los-angeles-friday/.
278. Id.
279. See id.
280. See id.
281. See id.
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Later in the lockout, Etan Thomas, the NBPA Executive First Vice
President, borrowed rhetoric from the Occupy Wall Street protestors in an
editorial in which he claimed that the owners were greedy and that the
players did not want to be exploited.282 Thomas characterized the owners
as the top one percent, thus implicitly associating the players with the
middle and lower classes (the 99%).283 He also suggested that the owners
wanted a bailout—to use another emotionally charged term from the Great
Recession—for their own financial mismanagement of their respective
franchises.284 This exploitation theme and analogy to the Occupy Wall
Street movement bordered on the ridiculous, given that the NBA players’
incomes squarely placed them in the top one percent of wage earners in
America, and did nothing to increase public sympathy and support.285 In
fact, it may well have turned off more members of the public to the union’s
positions. This may explain why, even when several commentators began
to side with the players in the lockout dispute, the players’ public relations
efforts still seemed to have little impact on the public.286 Based on
comments like Thomas’s and the apparent disingenuousness of the “Let Us
Play” campaign, the players—with their extravagant salaries—came off as
unsympathetic protagonists.287
In sum, the NBPA’s public relations campaign was flawed for a variety
of reasons. Unlike the SEIU and the Teamsters,288 the NBPA was not wellprepared for the lockout and their media strategy was ill-conceived and
poorly executed. While the union leadership attempted to educate members
about their public relations approach, players failed to promote a uniform
message and said—or tweeted—questionable things that reinforced existing
negative public perceptions of the players. Moreover, even when the
players were on message, their public relations themes seemed oblivious to
the economic climate. In this regard, even when the players had good
arguments or facts on their side, their messages did not resonate with the
public. The players’ public relations efforts were ultimately ineffective and
thus did not give the union the leverage it sought in its collective bargaining
282. Thomas, supra note 123.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. See Nick Hansen, NBA Lockout: An Open Letter to NBPA Vice President Etan
Thomas, BLEACHERREPORT (Nov. 21, 2011), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/948934-nbalockout-an-open-letter-to-nbpa-vice-president-etan-thomas.
286. See id.
287. See Moore, Dear Mr. Thomas, supra note 114.
288. See supra Part IV.A.1.
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negotiations. In fact, the union’s campaign may have ultimately hurt them
in the public eye—thus giving the owners even greater leverage—
explaining, in part, why the players wound up agreeing to such unfavorable
terms in the 2011 Agreement.
B. Union Democracy
1. The Importance of Member Communication and Engagement
For a union there may be no factor more important in collective
bargaining negotiations than mobilizing its rank-and-file members in a
contract campaign. Indeed, a union is most formidable when its members
are engaged in the collective bargaining process and united in their support
of the union’s platform and strategy. This reality highlights the importance
of union democracy, a theory in industrial relations scholarship that refers
to a type of union governance that prioritizes member preferences and gives
members considerable influence regarding the direction of the union.289 To
this end, union democracy envisions union members as having, at a
minimum, information regarding the work of the union, the ability to
communicate their views to other union members and leadership without
fear of retaliation, and free elections for the union.290 Unions are,
somewhat by definition, single-party bureaucracies,291 so the efficacy of
union democracy can best be judged by the union’s responsiveness to its
members’ views.292 Since democratic processes within a union do not
necessarily ensure or beget union democracy, one must look to see
“whether those [democratic] processes provide the substance of meaningful
participation and fairness.”293
Union democracy is particularly important because labor laws are
structured in a way to both support, but also potentially hinder, union
member participation.
For example, Congress enacted the Labor-

289. Clyde W. Summers, From Industrial Democracy to Union Democracy, 21 J. OF
LAB. RES. 3, 9 (2000) (stating that union democracy seeks to ensure that union members
“have an effective voice in determining unions [sic] policies and electing union officers”)
[hereinafter Summers, From Industrial Democracy].
290. Id.
291. 3 SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, MARTIN TROW & JAMES COLEMAN, UNION
DEMOCRACY: THE INTERNAL POLITICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION 9
(1956).
292. See Clyde W. Summers, Democracy in a One-Party State: Perspectives from
Landrum-Griffin, 43 MD. L. REV. 93, 95 (1984) [hereinafter Summers, Democracy in a OneParty State].
293. Summers, From Industrial Democracy, supra note 289, at 9.
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Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA)294—also
referred to as the Landrum-Griffin Act—to address the corruption and labor
racketeering that had infected many unions up until that point.295 The
purpose of the Act was to “protect union members from oppressive union
leadership while preserving the union’s right to adopt reasonable rules of
governance.”296
In short, LMRDA sought to strengthen union
297
democracy.
On the other hand, the principle of exclusive representation
in labor law—which affords a union the ability to be the sole negotiator in
the collective bargaining context for all workers in a particular industry298—
seems to de-emphasize members’ power vis-à-vis union leadership and may
even depress member participation.299 Exclusive representation can thus
preclude member participation in contract disputes and hinder members’
ability to hold their union leaders accountable.300
This seeming tension in labor law helps explain the two dominant forms
of collective bargaining: democratic and elitist. Democratic collective
bargaining occurs when unions ensure that their members have a “direct
and effective voice in the negotiation and ratification of the collective
[bargaining] agreement.”301 In this regard, the democratic model values and
promotes union member participation despite the utilitarian arguments
against this type of participation.302 Moreover, democratic collective
bargaining provides an incentive for the union leadership to be honest with
its members, to communicate with (and persuade) its members regarding
294. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (2012)).
295. Michael Goldberg, Derailing Union Democracy: Why Deregulation Would Be a
Mistake, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 137, 138 (2002).
296. Messina v. Local 1199 SEIU, Nat’l Health & Human Serv. Emps. Union, AFL-CIO,
205 F. Supp. 2d 111, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
297. See Grand Lodge of Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. King, 335 F.2d 340, 344 (9th Cir.
1964).
298. Michael A. McCann, Note, Illegal Defense: The Law and Economics of Banning
High School Players from the NBA Draft, 1 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 295, 354 (2002); see
also National Labor Relations Act, § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (providing for exclusive
representation); Clyde W. Summers, Exclusive Representation: A Comparative Inquiry into
a “Unique” American Principle, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 47, 47-49 (1998) (citing J.I.
Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944)) (explaining that section 9(a) allows a union to bind
all employees and also precludes employers from bargaining with a minority union or
directly with employees).
299. See Matthew Dimick, Revitalizing Union Democracy: Labor Law, Bureaucracy,
and Workplace Association, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 30 (2010).
300. Id.
301. Summers, From Industrial Democracy, supra note 289, at 11.
302. See Alan Hyde, Democracy in Collective Bargaining, 93 YALE L.J. 793, 837 (1984).
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what it believes to be attainable demands, and to provide opportunities for
member participation—even by dissenters—to help build unity within the
union.303
Elitist collective bargaining, on the other hand, consolidates union power
in its leadership—which speaks on behalf of the entire union.304 This
model thus has a small group of union leaders that “articulates demands,
forms the bargaining priorities, negotiates with the employer, and concludes
a binding agreement.”305 With this approach, union leaders may seek to
resolve the collective bargaining negotiations with the employer by any
means necessary: lying to members about the contents of a proposed
contract, not pursuing particular demands or simply not putting them in
writing, or even making payoffs to particularly influential union
members.306 This is not to say that elitist collective bargaining necessarily
precludes all democratic procedures. Indeed, even in this model, union
leadership may poll its members when initially forming demands or trying
to get “expressions of public support” from them.307 However, elitist
collective bargaining treats union democracy as a means to an end rather
than a goal in itself.308 Therefore, the model of collective bargaining that a
union employs—elitist versus democratic—will have implications for the
resolution of intra-union conflicts and the collective bargaining process
more generally.
While there is not much empirical research on the effects of union
democracy, two studies provide some insight into how it influences union
campaigns.309 The authors of these studies started with the hypothesis that
a greater degree of union democracy would lead to more congruence
between the objectives of union leaders, on the one hand, and union
members on the other.310 In other words, the union’s bargaining demands

303. Id. at 840.
304. Id. at 795.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 840.
307. Id. at 795.
308. See id.
309. Cheryl L. Maranto & Jack Fiorito, The Effect of Union Characteristics on the
Outcome of NLRB Certification Elections, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 225 (1987); Jack
Fiorito & Wallace E. Hendricks, Union Characteristics and Bargaining Outcomes, 40
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 569 (1987).
310. Fiorito & Hendricks, supra note 309, at 572; Maranto & Fiorito, supra note 309, at
227.
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would better reflect member preferences.311 Both studies found this
hypothesis to be true.312 Interestingly, one of the studies found that a
greater degree of union democracy improved non-wage outcomes, but
reduced wages when compared to unions with less democracy.313 The
authors noted that their finding was consistent with an industrial relations
theory that union leaders tend to overestimate member interest in wage over
non-wage issues.314 The authors thus concluded that greater union
democracy influences bargaining outcomes—but more in terms of the
“shape,” as opposed to the “size,” of the outcomes.315
Despite this study showing that union democracy led to more tailored
non-wage outcomes—rather than simply “more” outcomes (as is usually
associated with wages)—proponents of union democracy continue to
contend that more democratic unions are more effective at collective
bargaining than unions that follow the elitist approach.316 Indeed, the
Teamsters-UPS strike can be considered a paradigm of union democracy:
an engaged, unified rank-and-file membership helping reap significant
benefits in the collective bargaining process.317 However, other scholars
have expressed reservations about union democracy, arguing that it gives
union members too much power.318 Such power, they posit, results in more
democratic unions pursuing the rank-and-file objectives—which tend to be
motivated by short-term, selfish interests—at the expense of the union’s
long-term interests.319 Moreover, some scholars argue that the general
311. See Fiorito & Hendricks, supra note 309, at 572; Maranto & Fiorito, supra note 309,
at 227.
312. Fiorito & Hendricks, supra note 309, at 582; Maranto & Fiorito, supra note 309, at
238 (concluding that more democratic unions were more likely to win certification
elections).
313. Fiorito & Hendricks, supra note 309, at 580.
314. See id.
315. Id. at 582.
316. See, e.g., Robert Bruno, Democratic Goods: Teamster Reform and Collective
Bargaining Outcomes, 21 J. OF LAB. RES. 83, 84 (2000) (arguing that “when unions institute
democratic decision-making procedures and practices, they elicit valuable membership input
which subsequently increases the capacity of the institution to represent its members’
interest”); Michael J. Goldberg, In the Cause of Union Democracy, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
759, 763 (2008).
317. See Bruno, supra note 316, at 84.
318. See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers, Straw Men of Union Leadership, 80 YALE L.J. 687,
692 (1971) (reviewing DEREK C. BOK & JOHN T. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN
COMMUNITY (1968)) [hereinafter Summers, Straw Men].
319. Id. (discussing how Bok and Dunlop emphasize the “tendency of union members to
vote their narrow self-interest” and claim that the democratic process is a “nearly

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss1/1

2014]

LESSONS FROM THE NBA LOCKOUT

51

union membership tends to be more aggressive, less reasonable, and less
willing to compromise than union leadership.320 They likewise argue that
union members—emboldened through union democracy—will make
“uninformed, unintelligent emotional choice[s].”321 These scholars find
democratic collective bargaining inefficient322 and prefer an elitist
collective bargaining model with union leaders that are “imaginative,
efficient, . . . effective,”323 “enlightened,” and “responsible”—
characteristics that are euphemisms for leaders who are not beholden to
rank-and-file union membership and are able to take unpopular stances.324
Unsurprisingly, advocates for union democracy claim that unions can
effectively advocate for member preferences without sacrificing efficiency,
bargaining strategy, or long-term union objectives.325 Such proponents
argue against union leadership insulating itself from the rank-and-file union
membership.326 Instead, they believe that union leadership can strike a
balance between, on the one hand, soliciting members’ views to help
inform union policy and strategy and, on the other hand, setting forth a
vision for the union and persuading the members to support policies—even
unpopular ones—that benefit the union in the long-term.327 Indeed, it
insuperable obstacle[]” to achieving more efficient, effective leadership and long-range
planning).
320. See, e.g., Lucio Baccaro, Centralized Collective Bargaining and the Problem of
“Compliance”: Lessons from the Italian Experience, 53 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 579, 596
(2000) (challenging the idea that “centralized collective bargaining and workers’ direct
control over union policy are basically incompatible” and the assumption that workers are
more extreme and aggressive than union leaders); Hyde, supra note 302, at 849, 850-51
(discussing the assumption that “national union leaders, insulated from rank-and-file
pressure, are more ‘reasonable’ than local leaders or the rank and file itself” and the concern
that democratic collective bargaining is inefficient and leads to strikes, rather than
compromise). But see THOMAS R. COLOSI & ARTHUR ELIOT BERKELEY, COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING: HOW IT WORKS AND WHY 105 (3d ed. 2006) (explaining that union members
are sometimes less aggressive than the union’s leadership and will accept an offer that the
union leadership does not support to avoid layoffs or other cutbacks).
321. COLOSI & BERKELEY, supra note 320, at 106.
322. See Hyde, supra note 302, at 850-51.
323. Summers, Straw Men, supra note 318, at 692 (summarizing Bok and Dunlop’s
position).
324. Baccaro, supra note 320, at 596.
325. Summers, Straw Men, supra note 318, at 692-93 (“[U]nions . . . can be sensitive to
protecting democratic rights and maintaining democratic procedures and still strive for longterm social goals.”).
326. Id.
327. See CLARK, supra note 207, at 106-08 (stressing the need for effective
communication between the membership and leadership of unions); MIKE PARKER &
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renders union leadership essentially pointless if they merely carry out
members’ instructions, particularly when the leaders tend to be more
knowledgeable regarding union affairs and devote more of their time to
contemplating and crafting union strategy.328 Therefore, in order to achieve
this balance, there must be effective two-way communication between the
rank-and-file members and union leadership.329
Indeed, it is hard to overstate the importance of leader-member
communications within unions. As one scholar notes, “Union leaders have
a near monopoly on the channels of communication within the union, they
have special knowledge and access to information concerning the union and
its policies, and they have opportunities for extensive contacts with
members and for asserting leadership.”330 In this regard, to achieve
effective intra-union communication, union leaders need to take the
initiative to set forth their vision for the union—informed by membership
deliberation and input—and persuade members to support those policies.331
Success will be dictated, in large part, by members’ commitment to the
proposed plan.332 In fact, a union achieves its greatest power and influence
in collective bargaining negotiations when its members are supportive and
engaged.333 Therefore, union leaders should encourage discussion, hear
opposition, and educate members in order to refine and improve a plan
while gaining member support for it in the process.334 Accordingly,
effective union democracy necessitates an internal union campaign before
proceeding with an external campaign in the context of collective
bargaining negotiations.335

MARTHA GRUELLE, DEMOCRACY IS POWER: REBUILDING UNIONS FROM THE BOTTOM UP 4649 (1999). Union leaders can educate their members about the union’s long-term interests
and convince them to support policies that, while unpopular, advance these interests.
Summers, Straw Men, supra note 318, at 693.
328. PARKER & GRUELLE, supra note 327, at 48.
329. See CLARK, supra note 207, at 106-08.
330. Summers, Straw Men, supra note 318, at 693.
331. CLARK, supra note 207, at 106.
332. See PARKER & GRUELLE, supra note 327, at 48.
333. See Ann C. Hodges, Avoiding Legal Seduction: Reinvigorating the Labor Movement
to Balance Corporate Power, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 889, 903 (2011) (stating “[w]hen workers
are disconnected, their interest and participation wanes and any campaign for change loses
power” and “[i]f the union is unable to mobilize its members to support collective action in
their own workplace or the political arena, its power in both arenas is limited”).
334. PARKER & GRUELLE, supra note 327, at 48.
335. See id. at 48-49.
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Two-way communication is critical for gaining rank-and-file member
support, for one-way persuasion alone will be insufficient to secure such
support.336 Union members will feel insulted and disengaged if their
preferences have not been discussed and incorporated beforehand into the
union’s policies.337 Even unions that follow elitist collective bargaining
usually cultivate some rank-and-file member involvement at the start of a
negotiation campaign.338 In fact, leaders in highly bureaucratic unions are
still unlikely to ignore membership preferences as they are motivated by a
desire to retain their leadership positions and avoid membership loss.339
Indeed, union leadership needs the support of its members during contract
negotiations in order to draw significant crowds for rallies and pickets and
to carry on the campaign within the workplace.340 To this end, many unions
distribute surveys before a campaign to ascertain member preferences and
build a platform based, at least in part, on their priorities.341
However, an initial survey alone is usually insufficient, as members’
views are not static and may change over the course of the collective
bargaining negotiations.342 Union leadership must continue to receive
feedback from its members throughout the negotiation process.343 Such
comprehensive, ongoing communications between union leaders and
members should include “discussions at meetings, letters and columns in
newspapers, open-door policies at union offices, e-mail and message
centers, meetings with intermediate-level leaders, workplace walk-arounds,
‘working’ leadership, and social activities.”344 Moreover, effective twoway communication also requires union leaders to provide members with
up-to-date, accurate, and complete information using websites, emails, and
various forms of social media to communicate about dynamic events that
occur within the negotiation process.345

336. Id. at 52.
337. See id. at 48-49.
338. Summers, Democracy in a One-Party State, supra note 292, at 105-06.
339. See id.
340. PARKER & GRUELLE, supra note 327, at 52.
341. COLOSI & BERKELEY, supra note 320, at 90-91.
342. See CLARK, supra note 207, at 109 (noting that members views change during
negotiations); PARKER & GRUELLE, supra note 327, at 52 (explaining how initial surveys
may only provide limited choices and can sometimes merely reflect the strongest and most
pervasive views).
343. See CLARK, supra note 207, at 109.
344. PARKER & GRUELLE, supra note 327, at 52.
345. See id.
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When such intra-union deliberation and discourse precedes and
continues throughout collective bargaining negotiations, the likelihood that
leadership and member interests will align increases.346 In fact, such a
process can lead to greater membership support—so much so that if union
leadership reaches an impasse with management in its negotiations, union
members are more likely to support whatever action the union decides to
take.347 However, if union leaders fail to engage their members in robust
two-way communication, factions within the union are more likely to form
and thus weaken the union’s bargaining position.348 While some internal
conflict is inevitable regardless of the level of leader-member
communication, more democratic unions enjoy a higher likelihood to
resolve conflicts internally and thus present a unified front externally in
their collective bargaining negotiations.349 Moreover, without effective
intra-union communication, union leadership may pursue an agenda that
runs contrary to the interests of the rank-and-file members.350 In such
circumstances, union leaders run the risk that union members will resort to
self-help measures, such as “secondary associations,” in order to correct the
direction of the union.351 The potential threat of self-help remedies for
union members should provide an incentive for union leaders to maintain
open, two-way channels of communication in order to avoid the disruption
that oftentimes proves fatal for the union’s bargaining position.352
Union democracy and intra-union communication appear to be essential
components for an effective collective bargaining negotiation. An engaged,
well-informed union membership can help union leadership craft a platform
that it can then strategically and enthusiastically support. An ill-informed,
disengaged membership can lead to an erosion of support for union
leadership and ultimately a weaker bargaining position within the
negotiations. Therefore, it is incumbent on union leadership to not merely
346. See COLOSI & BERKELEY, supra note 320, at 91.
347. See id.
348. Baccaro, supra note 320, at 596.
349. Clyde Summers, Growth of Social Consciousness in Internal Union Affairs, 83
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 22, 23 (1960).
350. Samuel Estreicher, Deregulating Union Democracy, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
501, 512.
351. Dimick, supra note 299, at 18-20. Secondary associations are defined as “organized
or structured subgroups which while maintaining a basic loyalty to the larger organization
constitute relatively independent and autonomous centers of power within the organization.”
Id. (quoting LIPSET ET AL., supra note 291, at 15). These groups can undermine union
leadership. Id.
352. See id. at 18-22.
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persuade membership of a preordained platform, but to engage them in a
deliberation process, communicate with members throughout the
negotiations, and forge a strong relationship with the rank-and-file members
to strengthen the union’s overall bargaining position with management.
2. The NBPA’s Catastrophic Intra-Union Blunders
The importance of union democracy and intra-union communication may
have been even greater for the NBPA during the 2011 lockout given that
players’ unions are unique and more complex than unions in other
industries. This is due, in part, to the fact that professional athletes have
disparate skills and earning power, unlike members in most other privatesector unions.353 Professional sports feature an elite class of athletes whose
income—both salary from the particular sport and outside monies from
endorsements and the like—substantially exceeds that of the average
member of their union.354 Given their celebrity status and the resources to
attract top legal counsel and representation, these elite athletes can secure
advantageous contract terms without the help of their union. This
phenomenon suggests that players’ unions rose in these industries to protect
and further the interests of the more marginal player, who benefitted from
union efforts to raise players’ salaries and benefits.355 However, players’
unions remain relevant even to top-tier players, as the union negotiates
matters such as the salary cap and luxury tax, which are macro-level issues
that affect both individual players and the functioning of the sport more
generally.356

353. See Feldman, supra note 25, at 847; Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption
in Professional Sports, 1989 DUKE L.J. 339, 354-55 (stating “[u]nlike industrial employees,
professional athletes do not possess homogenous skills; a wide range of ability and expertise
exists among players” and also explaining that a lack of job security and a brief professional
career sets the NFLPA apart from other industrial unions). The only other similar privatesector unions would be those in the entertainment industry. See PAUL C. WEILER,
ENTERTAINMENT, MEDIA, AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 827, 829 (2d ed.
2002) (noting the “huge difference in the market value of superstars . . . and . . . bit players”
in the entertainment industry and the “stark disparities in earnings between a few
entertainment or sports celebrities and the vast bulk of their fellow team members”). For
example, in the early 2000s, Screen Actors Guild members’ salaries ranged from less than
$7500 to more than $5 million annually, with the majority of members earning less than
$7500. See id. at 828.
354. PAUL D. STAUDOHAR, THE SPORTS INDUSTRY AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 7 (2d
ed. 1989).
355. See id.
356. See WEILER, supra note 353, at 827-29.
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The effects of a stratified rank-and-file membership in players’ unions on
the collective bargaining process are clear and manifest themselves in
several ways.
For example, such income polarization creates a
distributional inequality within the union between the elite players and the
average player.357 In this scenario, the average players have access to fewer
resources than the elite players, who receive a disproportionate amount of
the industry’s resources.358 On the one hand, such income disparity still
benefits the average player because the elite players’ celebrity status
increases the players’ union’s overall bargaining power and thus leads to
more favorable terms for all members.359 In this regard, income
polarization within a players’ union involves an “equality-power
tradeoff.”360 On the other hand, such stratification can pose great risks to
union solidarity that, in turn, threatens to undermine the union’s bargaining
position.361 With a heterogeneous membership, the players’ union winds up
representing various internal constituencies.
Sometimes the union
advocates for terms that benefit elite players more than average players, and
vice versa.362
This division in internal constituent interests causes players’ unions to
lack the singularity of interest and cohesiveness that other private-sector
unions enjoy.363 As a result, the players’ union is more likely to find its
bargaining position compromised due to a lack of solidarity and unity
When the interests of union members
within its membership.364
substantially diverge, the intra-union dynamic can devolve into outright

357. See STAUDOHAR, supra note 354, at 7; see also WEILER, supra note 353, at 829
(noting that the “stark disparities in earnings between a few entertainment or sports
celebrities and the vast bulk of their fellow team members epitomize[s] what has been
happening in the broader ‘winner-takes-the-lion’s-share’ labor market for the last two
decades”).
358. See STAUDOHAR, supra note 354, at 7.
359. See Emily C. Chi, Star Quality and Job Security: The Role of the Performers’
Unions in Controlling Access to the Acting Profession, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 2324 (2000) (discussing this parallel dynamic in the entertainment industry with the Screen
Actors Guild and Actors’ Equity Association).
360. Id. at 24.
361. See Lock, supra note 353, at 354.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. See Kelli Shope, The Final Cut: How SAG’s Failed Negotiations with Talent Agents
Left the Contractual Rights of Rank-and-File Actors on the Cutting Room Floor, 26 J. NAT’L
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 123, 151-52 (2006) (providing an analogous situation with the
Screen Actors Guild).
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conflict, particularly with ineffective internal communications.365
Moreover, given the celebrity culture of professional sports, such internal
union conflicts inevitably wind up in media reports—further weakening the
union’s position.366
This context is a near pinpointed description of what occurred with the
NBPA during the 2011 lockout. The players certainly attempted to show
solidarity at the beginning of the lockout. Early on, more than fifty players
demonstrated their unity and resolve by showing up at a negotiation session
wearing matching T-shirts that read “STAND/2011 NBPA Summer
Meeting.”367 Many players also made public statements to the effect that
they would hold out until they received a fair deal.368 However, these initial
public signs of unity were belied by later events that demonstrated that the
NBPA was riddled with, and divided by, a difference in interests among the
players. Moreover, agents representing the players played a powerful and
ultimately disruptive role in the negotiations. Finally, union leadership
communicated poorly with its members. All of these factors led to distrust
and a weakening in the NBPA’s bargaining position.
a) A Difference in Players’ Interests
The lockout quickly brought to the forefront the tension and resentment
among players caused by the differing interests between the elite players
and the average players, as well as between the veteran players and the lessestablished players. For example, young players doubted whether veteran
players—who had already earned a majority of their NBA income—would
365. See PRINDLE, supra note 244, at 3 (describing this dynamic within analogous
entertainment industry unions).
366. See id. (noting that “any dispute within the guild is likely to wind up not only in the
headlines . . . but on the evening television news”).
367. Kurt Helin, NBA Players Show Up to Labor Talks Wearing “Stand” T-Shirts,
NBCSPORTS (June 24, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/06/24/nba-playersshow-up-to-labor-talks-wearing-“stand”-t-shirts/ [hereinafter Helin, NBA Players Wear
“Stand” T-Shirts].
368. See, e.g., Helin, Player Reaction, supra note 76 (noting general player sentiment for
a willingness to hold out for a fair deal); Kurt Helin, LaMarcus Aldridge Willing to Lose
Season to Get “Fair Deal”, NBCSPORTS (Aug. 24, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbc
sports.com/2011/08/24/lamarcus-aldridge-willing-to-loose-season-to-get-“fair-deal”/ (citing
LaMarcus Aldridge’s comments); Kurt Helin, Durant Says NBA Players Not Going to Give
In, NBCSPORTS (July 1, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/01/durantsays-nba-players-not-going-to-give-in/ (citing Kevin Durant’s comments); Kurt Helin,
Jamison Says Players More Unified Than Last Lockout, NBCSPORTS (July 1, 2011),
http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/01/jamison-says-players-more-unified-thanlast-lockout/ (citing Antawn Jamison’s comments).
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look out for the interests of those just beginning their careers in the
league.369 Given that the average players’ career is four and a half years,370
the younger players were anxious to settle the lockout and continue
playing—both to earn money and to further establish themselves in the
league.371 The fact that many veteran and elite players wanted to hold out
for a better deal caused great frustration among the younger players.372
The lockout also caused friction between the different classes of players.
One narrative that pervaded lockout discourse in the popular media was that
the NBA’s elite players—who generated a significant (and
disproportionate) amount of the league’s revenues—were, in fact,
underpaid given their value to their teams and the league as a whole.373 In
fact, some players’ agents, as well as some team owners, advocated for a
salary structure more akin to the NFL: where the elite players earn lucrative
salaries, while the majority of players earn an amount closer to the league’s
minimum salary.374 This suggestion infuriated many of the NBPA’s rankand-file members, who very much sought to preserve the NBA’s “middle
class”—that is, those players making between seven and ten million dollars
per season.375
These divergent interests in salary structure likely led the NBPA to keep
many of its superstar players out of the bargaining process to avoid sending

369. See Jason Lloyd, Cavs’ Samuels Would Have Accepted Deal but NBA Players
Union Rejects Owners’ Offer; Season in Jeopardy, AKRON BEACON J. ONLINE, Nov. 15,
2011, http://www.ohio.com/sports/cavs-samuels-would-have-accepted-deal-but-nba-playersunion-rejects-owners-offer-season-in-jeopardy-1.245552 (quoting Samardo Samuels, in
expressing frustration with Paul Pierce’s efforts to disband the union, as saying, “It’s easy
for Paul Pierce to say that. You’ve been in the league how long? You’ve got a decent
amount of money saved up, but what about the guys just coming into the league who don’t
have [anything] saved up?”).
370. McCann, supra note 43, at 768.
371. Kurt Helin, Some Players Have Not Felt “In the Loop” with Union, NBCSPORTS
(Nov. 15, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/15/some-players-have-notfelt-%E2%80%9Cin-the-loop%E2%80%9D-with-union/.
372. Id.
373. See, e.g., Kurt Helin, Are NBA’s Biggest Stars Underpaid? Actually, Yes.,
NBCSPORTS (Sept. 30, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/09/30/are-nba%
E2%80%99s-biggest-stars-underpaid-actually-yes/ (noting that Los Angeles Lakers owner
Jerry Buss privately told others that Kobe Bryant was worth $70 million per season, while
Bryant actually made $25 million during the 2010-11 season).
374. Id.
375. Id.
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inconsistent messages and perhaps exposing an intra-union fracture.376
Therefore, despite the belief by some players that the involvement of
superstars such as Kobe Bryant, Dwayne Wade, and Carmelo Anthony
would help the union in its negotiations—given that their earning power
and value to the league could give them leverage with the owners—NBPA
leadership felt the need to exclude them to keep a consistent, unified
message that attempted to resonate with the rank-and-file members of the
union.377 These types of intra-union conflicts ultimately undermined the
union’s bargaining position and allowed Commissioner Stern and the NBA
owners to use such divisions to their advantage.
b) The Disruptive Role of Players’ Agents
Another point of pressure on the union came from a source absent in
almost every other private-sector union: agents. Most, if not all, NBA
players have agents who represent them in contract negotiations,
endorsement deals, and the like.378 While agents were not directly involved
in the collective bargaining process—that is, they did not attend
negotiations between the NBPA and the league—they played an influential
role in advising their clients throughout the negotiation process.379 A
couple of months into the lockout, many agents pressed the players they
represented to advocate for decertification of the NBPA to create leverage
in the players’ negotiations with the owners.380 NBPA leadership
recognized the threat posed by the agents’ influence and resisted these
efforts, claiming that decertification was not ripe in terms of where the
negotiations stood and that it should come later, if necessary.381 In fact,
NBPA President Derek Fisher sent a letter to the players on the eve of a
players’ meeting, assuring them that progress was being made in the
376. See Kurt Helin, Is It Time for NBA Stars to Be More Vocal During Lockout?,
NBCSPORTS (Sept. 26, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/09/26/is-it-timefor-nba-stars-to-be-more-vocal-during-lockout. To be sure, the NBPA may have also been
relying on past experience in making this decision, as the involvement of superstars during
the 1990 lockout led to other players believing that the superstars were only representing
their own interests. Id.
377. See id.
378. Stacey B. Evans, Sports Agents: Ethical Representatives or Overly Aggressive
Adversaries?, 17 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 91, 98-99 (2010).
379. See Kurt Helin, Players Union Pushes Back on Agents Talking Decertification,
NBCSPORTS (Sept. 15, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/09/15/playersunion-pushes-back-on-agents-talking-decertification/.
380. Id.
381. Id.
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negotiations with the league.382 In particular, Fisher specifically addressed
the agents’ involvement by stating in the letter that none of the agents—
who were supposedly concerned about the state of the collective bargaining
negotiations—had contacted him about their concerns.383 Fisher was even
more pointed: he intimated that, unlike the NBPA, these disgruntled agents
did not have the players’ best interest in mind.384 Fisher closed his letter by
imploring the players to “stand with me.”385
Had the players followed their agents’ advice and forced a vote on
decertification at this point in the negotiations—in September 2011—it
would have amounted to a vote of no confidence in the NBPA.386 The
consequence, of course, would have been a near fatal blow to the union in
its negotiations with the owners, even if the decertification vote had
failed.387
Nevertheless, while Fisher’s efforts helped stave off a
decertification vote, the agents’ role in building such a decertification
movement still undermined the union’s bargaining position because media
reports let the owners and general public know of this internal discord.388
Moreover, from that point on, the NBPA leadership found itself battling the
increasing influence agents had on the players—a problem which continued
to weaken its bargaining position the more public the internal union strife
became. For example, later that month (September), Fisher again
distributed a letter in advance of another players’ meeting to assure the
players that the union would not “sell [players] out or sell [them] short.”389
He also reminded them that while the union represented the players in
collective bargaining negotiations, no agreement could be completed
without their vote.390 Both of these messages would seem, on their face, to
be unnecessary to articulate to union membership. As described further in
382. Kurt Helin, Fisher Sends Letter to NBA Players Stating Case, Smacking Agents,
NBCSPORTS (Sept. 15, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/09/15/fishersends-letter-to-nba-players-stating-case-smacking-agents/.
383. Id.
384. See id.
385. Id.
386. See Matt Moore, Leon Rose Joins the Decertification Rebel Alliance, NBCSPORTS
(Sept. 17, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/09/17/leon-rose-joins-thedecertification-rebel-alliance/ [hereinafter Moore, Leon Rose Joins].
387. See id.
388. See id.
389. Kurt Helin, Union President Fisher Sends Letter to Players Urging Unity,
NBCSPORTS (Sept. 26, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/09/26/unionpresident-fisher-sends-letter-to-players-urging-unity/.
390. Id.
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the next subsection, Fisher’s need to convey these messages may be an
indication of the NBPA’s lack of intra-union communication, planning, and
union democracy.
But it may also be an indication of just how influential the agents were in
this process, particularly the longer the lockout lasted and more player
frustration grew.391 This appeared to be the case even when some agents
seemed to take extreme—and perhaps unrealistic—positions given the
realities of the negotiation process. For example, in October 2011, several
high-profile agents sent their clients a letter encouraging them not to accept
any agreement that changed the BRI percentage allocated to the players
below the 57% threshold in the 2005 Agreement or that included any other
systemic changes.392 The agents also believed that the owners would
eventually back off of their stance of a 50-50 split in BRI.393 Again, the
union found itself on the defensive. Fisher sent yet another letter to players,
claiming that the agents’ letter was filled with “misinformation” and
“unsupported theories.”394
In these different ways, the NBPA was fighting two wars during the
2011 NBA lockout: one with the owners and one with the agents.
Throughout the lockout, the agents took a hard-line stance, from pushing
for decertification to not wanting to concede any major changes in BRI or
other important contract terms to the owners.395 This tension between
agents and the NBPA put players in the awkward situation of being forced
to doubt either their union or their agents.396 However, as the lockout wore
391. See Kurt Helin, Agents Talking Labor Deal, but Not Decertification. Yet.,
NBCSPORTS (Oct. 5, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/05/agentstalking-labor-deal-but-not-decertification-yet/.
392. Ric Bucher, Agents Issue Warning Letter to Clients, ESPN (Oct. 4, 2011), http://
espn.go.com/nba/story/_/id/7055538/nba-agents-group-warns-clients-joint-memo. But see
Kurt Helin, Top Agents Tell Clients to Reject Any More Givebacks in Labor Talks,
NBCSPORTS (Oct. 3, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/03/top-agentstell-clients-to-reject-any-givebacks-in-labor-deal/ [hereinafter Helin, Top Agents Tell]
(suggesting that the agents may have advocated for players not to accept a deal with the
players’ BRI set at below 52%).
393. Helin, Top Agents Tell, supra note 392.
394. Bucher, supra note 392.
395. See Adrian Wojnarowski, Players Discuss Decertification on Call, YAHOO (Nov. 3,
2011), http://sports.yahoo.com/nba/news?slug=aw-wojnarowski_nba_players_lockout_1103
11.
396. See Moore, Leon Rose Joins, supra note 386 (explaining that Chris Paul, a member
of the NBPA executive committee, found himself at odds with his agent, Leon Rose, who
was pushing for decertification while Paul was trying to maintain union unity and authority
in its negotiations with the owners).
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on, the agents were able to gain more player support for their positions.397
This eventual split in union membership—between the hard-line players
(who wanted to hold out for a better deal) and those players who were eager
to settle the labor dispute and begin the 2011-12 season—made it more
difficult for the NBPA to present a unified front to the media or the owners.
Such factionalism—spurred on by the agents—ultimately undermined the
NBPA’s bargaining position and helped contribute to the players settling
for a weaker set of terms in the 2011 Agreement than many expected.
c) Distrust of NBPA Leadership and the Botched Decertification
Approach
The NBPA never seemed to have unity among its members, even at the
beginning of the lockout. For example, within days of when the lockout
began, Shane Battier asked if NBPA Executive Director Billy Hunter was
going to take his normal salary during the lockout—alluding to DeMaurice
Smith, the executive director of the NFL players’ union, who took a salary
of one dollar during the NFL lockout.398 Battier’s question seemed to
evince a lack of trust in—or at least a certain amount of hostility or
resentment towards—Hunter and perhaps union leadership more generally.
Moreover, despite their players’ public show of support with the
“STAND/2011” T-shirts at the first negotiating meeting after the lockout
began, attendance at player meetings was lackluster at best.399 As outside
pressures increased, players’ lack of engagement and distrust of NBPA
leadership grew.
In late October 2011, a rumor surfaced that NBPA President Derek
Fisher and NBPA Executive Director Billy Hunter were at odds.400 The
report claimed that Fisher was willing to take a 50-50 split on BRI and end

397. See id.
398. Kurt Helin, Battier Asks Union President to Take $1 Salary During Lockout,
NBCSPORTS (June 30, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/06/30/battierasks-union-president-to-take-1-salary-during-lockout/. While never confirmed, reports
suggest that Billy Hunter continued to draw his normal salary during the lockout. See
Report: Bill Hunter Scoffs at Notion of Taking $1 Salary During Lockout, SPORTINGNEWS
(June 30, 2011), http://www.sportingnews.com/nba/feed/2010-10/nba-labor/story/reportbilly-hunter-scoffs-at-notion-of-taking-1-salary-during-lockout.
399. See Helin, NBA Players Wear “Stand” T-Shirts, supra note 367.
400. Howard Beck, N.B.A. Talks Resume (Between Union Officials), N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3,
2011, at B18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/03/sports/basketball/nba-talksresume-between-union-officials.html.
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the lockout, while Hunter wanted to hold out for more.401 Both denied the
rift, but many believed that some of the hard-line players leaked the rumor
to put pressure on NBPA leadership to agree to a percentage below 53%
BRI for the players.402 While both Fisher and Hunter sent letters to the
players urging unity,403 the players’ lack of trust in their leaders was
deepening. A sports reporter picked up on this increasing dissension among
the players in an article in which he claimed that Fisher was not
representing the players’ interests because Fisher hoped to secure a job with
the league once he retired from playing basketball.404 Fisher strongly
denied this characterization and, specifically, the existence of any side deals
with the league.405 A few days later, Fisher took another public blow from
fellow player Jerry Stackhouse, who said that he did not want Fisher
negotiating on his behalf.406 Finally, even those players who were not in
the anti-NBPA leadership or hardliner camp felt distrust towards Hunter as
he appeared to make unilateral negotiating decisions without the input of
the players.407
Commissioner Stern thrived off of this distrust of union leadership and
used it to his advantage. At pivotal moments in the negotiations, Stern
would paint the NBPA leadership as inept and scare the players with threats

401. Kurt Helin, Union Head Billy Hunter Denies Any Rift with Derek Fisher,
NBCSPORTS (Oct. 31, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/31/union-headbilly-hunter-denies-any-rift-with-derek-fisher/.
402. See id.
403. Kurt Helin, Billy Hunter Sends Another Letter to Players Urging Unity, NBCSPORTS
(Nov. 1, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/01/billy-hunter-sendsanother-letter-to-players-urging-unity/.
404. Jason Whitlock, Is Fisher in Stern’s Back Pocket?, FOXSPORTS (Oct. 29, 2011)
http://msn.foxsports.com/nba/story/Whitlock-NBA-lockout-David-Stern-has-Derek-Fisherin-back-pocket-Billy-Hunter-players-union-not-pleased-102811.
405. Kurt Helin, Fisher Thrashes Report, Urges Unity in Letter to Players, NBCSPORTS
(Nov. 1, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/01/fisher-thrashes-reporturges-unity-in-letter-to-players/.
406. Kurt Helin, Stackhouse Smacks Fisher in Interview; the Union Has Issues,
NBCSPORTS (Nov. 3, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/03/stackhousesmacks-fisher-in-interview-the-union-has-issues/.
407. See Kurt Helin, Infighting Within Union Spills Over into Media Labor Reports,
NBCSPORTS (Nov. 1, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/01/infightingwithin-union-spills-over-into-media-labor-reports/ [hereinafter Helin, Infighting Within
Union] (noting that players were critical when Hunter walked out of a negotiation with the
owners when they would not agree to a 52-48 split in BRI in favor of the players).
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of even worse deals than the one he was currently proposing.408 Stern did
this in mid-October when he undermined Hunter’s credibility by hinting
that Hunter had suggested a 50-50 split in BRI—something many players
saw as selling them out in their hopes for a 53-47 split in the players’
favor—but that Hunter could not convince his union members to agree to
the deal.409 This strategic move coincided with the intra-union conflict—
regarding whether to accept a deal or continue to hold out for a better
deal—becoming public.410 Two weeks later, Stern again destabilized the
rank-and-file players by announcing that the negotiations had broken down
because the union refused to accept less than 52% BRI.411 Stern threatened
to cancel games—which would not be made up—and reduce the owners’
offer to 47% of BRI for the players if the players did not accept the latest
offer.412 Despite having not yet missed a paycheck at this point, the
players’ resolve—and faith in their union—began to crumble. Media
reports suggested that many players were willing to agree to a 50-50 BRI
split.413 This was a critical turning point in the negotiations, as the players
had previously demanded 54% or 53% of BRI and drawn a line at 52.5% of
BRI.414
It was at this point that the hard-line players and agents pursued
decertification in earnest, without support of union leadership.415 Fifty
players held a conference call with an antitrust lawyer and agreed that they
408. See, e.g., Kurt Helin, Stern Tries to Frighten NBA Players into Taking Deal,
NBCSPORTS (Oct. 28, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/28/stern-triesto-frighten-nba-players-into-taking-deal/.
409. Matt Moore, Stern: If No Deal by Tuesday, Christmas Games May Be Canceled,
NBCSPORTS (Oct. 13, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/13/stern-if-nodeal-by-tuesday-christmas-games-may-be-canceled/.
410. Rob Mahoney, First Word From Today’s Union Meeting: Some Players Ready to
Cave to Owners’ Demands, NBCSPORTS (Oct. 14, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbc
sports.com/2011/10/14/players-are-ready-to-cave/ (quoting JaVale McGee as stating,
“There’s definitely some guys in there saying they’re ready to fold, but the majority are
willing to stand strong”). McGee later denied making the statement, but it was caught on
tape. Id.
411. Helin, Infighting Within Union, supra note 407.
412. Id.
413. See Kurt Helin, Were Fisher, Kobe Down with 50/50 Split? Maybe, as Some Players
Are, NBCSPORTS (Oct. 30, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/30/werefisher-kobe-down-with-5050-split-maybe-but-some-players-are/.
414. Id.
415. Howard Beck, N.B.A. Talks to Resume Amid Threat to Decertify, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
4, 2011, at B10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/04/sports/basketball/nbatalks-to-resume-saturday.html?pagewanted=all.
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would pursue decertification if the union made any further concessions—
namely, falling below 52.5% of BRI.416 While some saw the call as an
attempt to give leverage to the union—with the threat of decertification
looming417—it nevertheless signaled a lack of unity among players and a
lack of confidence in NBPA leadership. Perhaps sensing his opportunity to
end the lockout on favorable terms for the owners, Stern gave several
ultimatums to players in early to mid-November in which he offered deals
with a 51% to 49% band of BRI for the players.418 Stern also claimed that
if the players did not accept the deal, the owners would lower their offer to
47% of BRI for the players and either a hard salary cap or a “flex” salary
cap.419 Stern increased the pressure on union leadership by releasing the
offer to USA Today420 and posting a memo regarding the offer on
NBC.com.421 The players—and thus the union—were terribly divided at
this point. Roughly half of the players wanted to vote on the owners’
offers, while the other half pushed decertification as a move to leverage
416. Id. (observing that the hardline players did not want an agreement where teams
paying the luxury tax could not use sign-and-trade agreements or the mid-level exception).
But see Matt Moore, Not All 50 Players United in Decertification Effort on Reported
Conference Calls, NBCSPORTS (Nov. 5, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/
2011/11/05/not-all-50-players-united-in-decertification-effort-on-reported-conference-calls/
[hereinafter Moore, Not All 50 Players United] (explaining that the players involved in the
conference call were not unified behind the idea of decertification, which could cost the
players more than one season, and that decertification was only one of several options
discussed during the call).
417. See Moore, Not All 50 Players United, supra note 416.
418. Helin, Stern Gives Players New Ultimatum, supra note 183 (describing Stern’s
November 10, 2011 offer); Kurt Helin, Choice Before Players: Take Stern’s Offer or
Decertify, NBCSPORTS (Nov. 6, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/06/
choice-before-players-take-stern%E2%80%99s-offer-or-decertify/ (detailing the Stern’s
November 6, 2011 offer, including “a mini mid-level of about $2 million for teams paying
the luxury tax, no sign-and-trades for taxpayers, and a $1 repeater tax”).
419. Matt Moore, David Stern Sets Ultimatum for Players: Accept Deal by Wednesday or
Offer Gets Worse, NBCSPORTS (Nov. 6, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/
2011/11/06/david-stern-sets-ultimatum-for-players-accept-deal-by-wednesday-or-offer-getsworse/ (describing Stern’s ultimatum).
420. Helin, Powerpoint Version, supra note 182.
421. Kurt Helin, In Latest Attempt to Sway, David Stern Has Memo for Players,
NBCSPORTS (Nov. 14, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/14/in-latestattempt-to-sway-david-stern-has-memo-for-players/ (detailing Stern’s description of the
offer as having a 50-50 BRI split, expanding market opportunities for mid-level players,
permitting “unlimited use of the Bird Exception,” allowing sign-and-trade agreements for
non-taxpaying teams, and permitting “an active free agent market and greater player
movement”).
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their negotiations.422 The NBPA leadership avoided a vote on the owners’
proposals, confining its discussion only to team representatives and
executive committee members.423
Many thought that the union would modify (and then approve) the offer
and send it back to the owners—bringing the two sides closer to
resolution.424 However, as described in Part II.C., the NBPA team
representatives and executive committee members rejected the owners’
latest offer and voted to begin the decertification process by sending a
notice of disclaimer to the NBA.425 While the union leadership thought that
such a move would appease the hard-line players and agents, it was met
with shock because the union chose the disclaimer of interest method of
decertification.426 If the goal of moving toward decertification was to gain
leverage on the owners, the union’s move was understandably questionable
because the disclaimer of interest approach proceeds rather quickly—which
was not necessarily in the players’ best interest.427 By contrast, the players
could have petitioned for a vote on decertification, which would have
provided a forty-five day negotiating window and the leverage they were
seeking.428 Perhaps the union leadership chose the disclaimer of interest
route worrying that the players would vote against decertification and
accept the latest owners’ offer—an outcome the NBPA leadership wanted
to avoid.429 At this point, the media questioned the union’s strategy,430 and
it became clear that the players did not really understand the ramifications
of the disclaimer of interest approach compared to a vote on decertification.
It seemed that the disclaimer of interest decision stemmed from a sense of
powerlessness—and overt exclusion of the rank-and-file players—rather
than an informed decision-making process.
422. See Kurt Helin, NBA Players Reject Stern’s Ultimatum, Want More Negotiations,
NBCSPORTS (Nov. 8, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/08/nba-playersreject-stern’s-ultimatum-want-more-negotiations/ (noting player interest in voting on the
owners’ proposals); Kurt Helin, Tolliver Admits Union Membership Divided on Next Move,
NBCSPORTS (Nov. 8, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/08/tolliveradmits-union-membership-divided-on-next-move/ (describing player division over
decertification or voting on the owners’ proposal).
423. Helin, Stern Gives Players New Ultimatum, supra note 183.
424. See, e.g., Helin, Powerpoint Version, supra note 182.
425. See supra text accompanying notes 167-188.
426. See supra text accompanying notes 189-195.
427. See Helin, Players’ Idea to Decertify, supra note 114.
428. Id.
429. See Helin, NBA Union Did Not Poll Players, supra note 195.
430. Id.
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The union leadership was understandably criticized for excluding its
general membership from the decision-making process, particularly at a key
moment like the decertification decision. Some players complained
publicly about being excluded from the decertification and disclaimer of
interest meeting.431 The NBPA leadership defended itself by stating that it
was the union’s role to decide what proposal, if any, it should present to the
players, because the leadership was savvier than the general membership in
identifying a good deal.432 This statement clearly showed that the union
believed in an elitist form of collective bargaining rather than democratic
collective bargaining. However, the union’s explanation still did not fully
account for the general membership marginalization. Team representatives
were theoretically empowered to act on behalf of their teammates, but some
team representatives failed to discuss the disclaimer of interest matter with
their teammates before the vote.433 Moreover, some team representatives
did not even have current phone numbers for the teammates they
represented.434 In these regards, many in the union’s general membership
were not afforded an opportunity to give their input at critical moments of
the negotiation process, nor did they receive information regarding various
proposals and potential responses.
d) Poor Intra-Union Communication and a Lack of Union Democracy
On November 26, 2011—twelve days after the union voted to dissolve—
the owners and players reached the agreement that became the 2011
Agreement.435 However, from the players’ standpoint, the terms were no
better than many of the previous proposals, and the players wound up
conceding on many key terms that shifted significant revenue from the
431. Id. (citing Kevin Martin, who argued that players should have had a vote “because
we’re all grown men and it’s time for players to control their career decisions, and not one
player per team”).
432. See Henry Abbott, Union Makes Big Move Without Polling Members, ESPN (Nov.
14,
2011),
http://espn.go.com/blog/truehoop/post/_/id/33289/union-makes-big-movewithout-polling-members. But see Moore, supra note 124 (noting that the NBPA leadership
likely kept the rank-and-file union members uninformed and at a distance so that they would
not realize how badly the negotiations with the owners were going).
433. Kurt Helin, Lakers Steve Blake Said He Did Not Support 50/50 Deal, NBCSPORTS
(Nov. 16, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/16/lakers-steve-blake-saidhe-did-not-support-5050-deal/ [hereinafter Helin, Blake Did Not Support 50/50 Deal].
434. Id.
435. Mike Bresnahan, NBA Players, Owners Reach Tentative Agreement to End Lockout,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/26/sports/la-sp-nba-labor20111126.
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players to the owners. One compelling explanation for the ineffectiveness
of the NBPA—and the players’ negotiation efforts more generally—is the
lack of union democracy within the NBPA and the poor communication
between union leadership and players. While the NBPA attempted to give
its members information regarding the lockout before it even began—
through the “Lockout Handbook”436—there is very little evidence that the
union communicated effectively with its members. In fact, the information
known publicly suggests the opposite. For example, team representatives
did not adequately communicate with their teammates during
negotiations.437 From media accounts, it did not appear as though the union
organized regular conference calls, provided frequent progress updates, or
explained current strategy to the players.438 Productive intra-union
communication is critical for the success of the union, but the NBPA
seemed so ineffective in its internal communications strategy that most
players received their information regarding the negotiations through the
media.439
One reason for the NBPA’s poor intra-union communication may be its
embrace of the elitist form of collective bargaining, where the leadership
speaks on behalf of the entire union with minimal rank-and-file
involvement.440 However, even in highly bureaucratic unions like the
NBPA, there is a role for union democracy and member engagement.441
Nevertheless, the NBPA leadership did not communicate with its members
nor seek to engage them in any meaningful fashion. Indeed, the union
leaders strategically excluded the rank-and-file players at key points in the
negotiation.442 In this way, the NBPA seemed to embrace the “by any
means necessary” approach to elitist collective bargaining, alienating and

436. Levinson, supra note 77.
437. Helin, Blake Did Not Support 50/50 Deal, supra note 433.
438. Marc J. Spears, Paul Pierce: Players Needed to Make Stand, YAHOO (Nov. 20,
2011),
http://sports.yahoo.com/nba/news;_ylt=AnqURQ15UKkkyBGD_cg03fG8vLYF?
slug=mc-spears_paul_pierce_celtics_nba_lockout_111911 (quoting Paul Pierce: “A lot of
[the players] are on the outside looking in. They kind of followed the negotiations on
[television]”).
439. E.g., id.; Matt Moore, Nazr Mohammed Was Doing So Well, Too, NBCSPORTS
(Nov. 12, 2011), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/12/nazr-mohammed-wasdoing-so-well-too/ (describing one player’s publically negative reaction to a proposal that
had already been rejected in the negotiations themselves).
440. See Abbott, supra note 432; Hyde, supra note 302, at 795.
441. See Hyde, supra note 302, at 795.
442. Abbott, supra note 432.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss1/1

2014]

LESSONS FROM THE NBA LOCKOUT

69

marginalizing many players and ultimately undermining their negotiation
efforts.443
What the NBPA may have needed was better union democracy, which
could have provided more meaningful ways for the players to effectively
voice their concerns in the negotiations with the owners. This is not to say
that the NBPA leadership should have merely carried out the players’
instructions, particularly when the union’s leaders were more
knowledgeable about the contract terms in the various proposals, as well as
the collective bargaining process in general. However, the union leadership
did not engage its membership in a deliberative, communicative process—
either before or during the lockout—to gauge members’ priorities and
interests, and missed an opportunity to build unity through such a process.
To be sure, there were some signs of intra-union communication and union
democracy. For example, most players seemed to have adopted the mantra
of wanting a “fair deal,” and the union was able to engage some of the
players in a public show of support with the “STAND/2011 NBPA Summer
Meeting” T-shirts.444 Nevertheless, these modest efforts fall short of the
limited union democracy efforts in which even unions adhering to elitist
collective bargaining engage.445
More importantly, the lack of union democracy hurt union leadership
throughout its negotiations. While the players used the buzz term “fair
deal,”446 the union clearly had not facilitated deliberative conversations
among its membership to build consensus as to what a “fair deal” would
look like. The union had not educated the players as to what it might cost
them to achieve this “fair deal”—like an extended lockout—and the
sacrifices necessary to achieve it. Nor had the NBPA leadership
realistically framed the dispute—and the financial and other concessions
that would likely need to be made to the owners—to help manage players’
expectations and build consensus around a negotiation plan and contract
terms on which most players could agree. While not all of the NBPA’s
actions were publicized, it appeared as though there were not the type of
ongoing communications between the NBPA leadership and the rank-and-

443. See Hyde, supra note 302, at 840.
444. Helin, NBA Players Wear “Stand” T-Shirts, supra note 367.
445. See Hyde, supra note 302, at 840.
446. See, e.g., Report: NBA to Cancel More Games, ESPN (Oct. 25, 2011),
http://espn.go.com/nba/story/_/id/7146097/nba-lockout-2011-league-cancel-two-moreweeks-regular-season-according-report.
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file players that mark successful union collective bargaining efforts.447 In
short, the union leadership failed on a number of fronts: setting forth a
vision for the union; working with its members to educate them;
encouraging union members to help inform and shape the process; and
ultimately leading the players towards coalescing around a unified, single
objective.
One could argue that the NBPA leadership was not solely to blame for
the general membership being uninformed and disengaged. Indeed, at least
one commentator has argued that the rank-and-file players should have
taken more ownership of their role in the collective bargaining
negotiations.448 He claimed that the players should have demanded more
communication from the union leadership, taken efforts to better understand
the terms of the different proposals that the owners and union presented,
and insisted on demanding a vote on decertification.449 Moreover, player
meetings were sparsely attended, even though all players were invited.450
However, one need only look to the quintessential example of the
decertification vote—where the union leaders explicitly chose not to allow
players to vote—to see how disengaged and uninformed players were
throughout the process due to the NBPA leadership’s belief in elitist
collective bargaining.
Two-way communication within a union is critical for its success in
collective bargaining negotiations, yet the NBPA lacked this important
element. It is unsurprising, then, that many players felt insulted by, and
disengaged from, their union, as their preferences were not being heard nor
were they ever really solicited. This faulty approach on the part of union
leadership only exacerbated the problems created by divergent interests in a
stratified union like the NBPA. While it is true that division in member
interests can likely lead to a lack of solidarity within a union like the
NBPA, the union leadership did nothing to help resolve such internal
conflicts.451 Moreover, the NBPA’s elitist approach also did not properly
account for the problematic—yet predictable—role that agents played in the
process. By failing to build unity and consensus among the players, the
447. Cf. PARKER & GRUELLE, supra note 327, at 52 (emphasizing the two-way nature of
communication in an effective union).
448. Moore, The Real Problem, supra note 124.
449. Id.
450. Mark Medina, NBA Lockout: Uninformed Players Should Blame Themselves, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2011, http://lakersblog.latimes.com/lakersblog/2011/11/nba-lockoutplayers-uninformed-about-lockout-proceedings-only-have-themselves-to-blame-.html.
451. See Lock, supra note 353, at 354.
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NBPA leadership helped create the opportunity for agents to divide the
players along lines that reinforced player stratification. It is no wonder that
there was such obvious player distrust of, and resentment toward, the
NBPA leadership.
The lack of intra-union communication and union democracy ultimately
spelled doom for the players. Without effective communications and a
unified membership, the NBPA was left vulnerable to manipulation by both
agents and Commissioner Stern. Indeed, during key points of the
negotiations, Stern was incredibly effective in using threats and ultimatums
to further divide the players and force the union into unfavorable bargaining
positions. Had the players felt invested and empowered in the collective
bargaining process, the NBPA would likely have had a better chance at
unifying the players around a single goal and maintaining a stronger
bargaining position. However, in light of the union infighting and divisions
that occurred due to poor intra-union communication and a lack of union
democracy, the players lost much of their bargaining power and leverage
and were forced to agree to such unfavorable terms in the 2011 Agreement.
V. Conclusion
When the NBA lockout began in the summer of 2011, most analysts
predicted that the players would need to make some concessions in order to
change the league’s outdated economic structure. Nonetheless, the extent
of the concessions made by the NBPA in the new 2011 Agreement was
unexpected. Two conventional explanations offer helpful insight as to why
this result occurred. NBA players did not prepare well financially for an
extended lockout and thus felt compelled to sacrifice their long-term
interests for the short-term resolution of collecting a paycheck again.
Commentators also noted that players became (too) emotional in their
negotiations, especially in light of the racial overtones that marked the
historic and current relationship between players and team owners. Both of
these explanations offer a good, but only partial, account of why the players
accepted such a poor deal for themselves.
This article has argued that a more complete account of the negotiations
surrounding the 2011 Agreement should include a closer look at the
structure and operations of the players’ union. As research in the fields of
communications and industrial relations has shown, union democracy,
intra-union communications, and effective public relations have been
crucial elements of successful negotiations for workers in the past. By
contrast, the NBPA suffered from poor, and somewhat exclusionary,
relationships with its members and launched mostly ineffective (and, at
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times, downright out-of-touch) corporate campaigns.
Against this
weakened position of the union, Commissioner Stern was able to take quick
and effective advantage to gain most, if not all, of the concessions that the
owners wanted.
The lessons that emerge from this expanded analytical framework are
relatively straightforward, especially for players’ unions in light of the
NBPA’s experience, but also for other private-sector unions. Unions must
better prepare their members for an extended labor dispute and channel
members’ negative emotions toward employers to cultivate a greater sense
of solidarity. They must also recognize their relatively unpopular starting
position and work to craft an effective public relations strategy that will
generate public support for workers and apply pressure on employers. At
the same time, unions must also be mindful of the importance of
communication and participation among their members to avert problems
stemming from lack of information and disengagement. Moreover,
research indicates that union democracy tends to enhance nonwage
outcomes, a point that may be useful for addressing the racial dynamics of
the NBA.
To be sure, abiding by these lessons may not always bring about
substantial gains for labor unions and their members. Much of what drives
the outcomes of collective bargaining negotiations, in the NBA and
elsewhere, is the economics of the industry. On the other hand, as this
analysis of the 2011 Agreement demonstrates, players and workers can end
up agreeing to terms that are less favorable than they could be when they
fail to plan for—and properly execute a strategy regarding—certain
predictable issues. Indeed, it appears that such future planning is critical in
the union’s ability to secure a “fair deal” instead of settling for a
substandard one.
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